Page 71 - Week 01 - Wednesday, 28 February 2007
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Ministers are appointed to administer Departments and associated agencies. They are required to be pro-active and to accept responsibility.
Doubtless in 1999 Mr Stanhope would have agreed with this definition—extolled it—and certainly the code of conduct under the Carnell government indicated this requirement. At page 59 of volume II of the coronial report Mr Stanhope is quoted as saying that there was no discussion during the cabinet meeting of a threat to the urban area in terms of “real possibility”. He said such discussion was in terms of nothing more than a “theoretical possibility”. But a theoretical possibility, when you can see and smell fires, beggars belief.
The coroner has stated clearly on page 159 that the senior personnel at the ESB knew that a potential threat existed before 17 January. It is clear from the report that over the course of the 17th the situation deteriorated rapidly and that by the evening the fires were likely to impact on Canberra within the next 24 hours. Under the convention of ministerial responsibility a capable minister, one serving the people of the ACT with the required level of diligence, even in a temporary role, would have gone out of their way to be informed of this danger and to be in a position to make an informed decision. They would have pressed the issue of a theoretical possibility in the cabinet meeting and subsequently to ensure that there was a capability to react to and respond to this possibility. In the words of Sir Peter Lawler, the minister in the charge at the time of the fires should have acted proactively.
What action was taken to ensure that the decisions were the correct ones? How did the Chief Minister ensure that he could make an informed decision that was the best possible for the people of Canberra? The Chief Minister was in charge of the ESB on those dates in question, 17 and 18 January. It is clear from the coroner’s findings that at the same time the senior personnel in the ESB knew of the imminent danger to Canberra’s suburbs and Mr Stanhope knew from the cabinet briefing on the 16th that at the least, and by his own admission, the threat to urban areas was a theoretical possibility.
The minister in charge, the man most proximate to the situation, Mr Stanhope, had a responsibility to be aware of this danger and to act on it—and he chose not to. He failed to fulfil his responsibility to the people of Canberra and as a direct result residents did not receive a timely warning of the impending disaster. By the time the Chief Minister eventually decided to act, at 3.00 pm on 18 January, houses in Duffy were already burning.
The coroner has also criticised Mr Stanhope’s actions at 3.00 pm on the 18th, saying that he either misinterpreted or downplayed the seriousness of the situation—again he failed in his responsibility. The Chief Minister said live on radio at about 3.00 pm on 18 January:
I hope that people won’t be too anxious about this. People certainly have no need to be unduly alarmed …
We were told here today that he mentioned the word “emergency” four or five times so we should all understand what he means. But anyone hearing that message would
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