Page 70 - Week 01 - Wednesday, 28 February 2007
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if you turn to page 58 of volume II in the briefing paper that was presented there were such highlights as:
The weather forecast for the coming five days was alarming.
The weather and fire risk situations were described as a one-in-40-year event and a one-in-20-year event respectively.
There was discussion of the procedures for declaring a state of emergency and the situation in which this would need to be done.
The likelihood of a state emergency needing to be declared was assessed as between 40 and 60 per cent.
There was discussion of ‘major infrastructure loss’.
Yet we are told today: “Well, you know, I didn’t really have cause for alarm. We were all very relaxed about it and didn’t realise how serious things were.” Certainly the people of Canberra, as do I and my colleagues, struggle to accept the veracity of that defence and the cursory way in which the Chief Minister is attempting to step around the adverse findings that are contained in Coroner Doogan’s report.
The ministerial code of conduct has been cited by my colleagues; I think Mr Pratt made reference to it. This code, introduced in February 2004, says:
Ministers have responsibility for the operations and performance of their departments and agencies in accordance with the provisions of the Public Sector Management Act and the Financial Management Act.
The current code of conduct does not detail exactly when a minister should be held accountable for the mistakes of their departments or agencies, but fortunately the Chief Minister has placed on record his exact views on the subject. He has said clearly in this place that the test for ministerial responsibility is proximity. It is appropriate that we apply Mr Stanhope’s proximity test to the period encompassing the Canberra bushfires. We must ask the Chief Minister how proximate he was to the events leading up to and on 18 January 2003.
The coroner has found that on the evidence Mr Stanhope, along with the rest of his cabinet, was told on the morning of 16 January that there was serious potential that the fires would affect assets in the ACT, including potentially Canberra’s suburbs. I draw your attention to page 62 of volume II. She also found that no specific warnings or even general information about the serious risk facing parts of the ACT were issued. This shows a remarkable disdain for the people of Canberra. A serious risk existed but no effort was made to communicate this to the people.
Indeed, later in the report the coroner refers to expert testimony from Sir Peter Lawler on the principle of ministerial responsibility—and I suppose he will be dismissed too, as the coroner was, on the basis that he has got no business knowing about these things, despite a distinguished public service career. But I am going to stick with what Sir Peter says in his testimony, because I believe he sums up ministerial requirements very well when he says:
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