Page 403 - Week 02 - Tuesday, 7 March 2006
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not the woman was pregnant. The perpetrator is more likely to know that the woman is pregnant in an instance, for instance, of domestic violence.
In these cases, and a key reason why I did not support Mr Pratt’s amendment, the harm is more likely to be intended to hurt the woman through harming her pregnancy and making it less likely that she will have a healthy, happy full-term child. We are talking in this legislation, despite what Mr Pratt has tried to introduce, about a crime against the woman which intentionally or inadvertently affects her pregnancy or her foetus in utero. That right is intended, if it is intentional, to harm the woman primarily. For this reason I am glad that the government reconsidered the clauses within the new section 48A. It will allow the defendant to try to prove to the courts that they did not have knowledge of the pregnancy so that that could be considered at the conviction stage.
This was a point that my staff and I raised at a briefing that has been mentioned by the Attorney-General. It is extremely heartening to know that in fact dialogue takes place in those cases and that the government took on the suggestions that I believe improve this legislation. Perhaps he can make it a model for other states and territories. However, in the Attorney-General’s closing speech, I would be interested to hear his opinion on whether or not this amendment will impact on the new section 29 (2A) regarding culpable driving of a motor vehicle, for in this case it is almost impossible for the assailant to know, for a start, that a car that he may have a crash with contains a woman; and, secondly, that that woman is pregnant.
MR PRATT (Brindabella) (5.22): Of course we will not support this amendment. This amendment waters down the Attorney-General’s legislation. Mr Stefaniak has quite forensically taken apart the Attorney-General’s amendment in terms of discussing and illustrating those areas which really do need protection. If the Attorney-General did not seek to amend his law, those protections would still be in place.
I talk, for example, of the shadow Attorney-General’s example of eggshell skull provisions in law. I talk also about the culpable driving which results in the death of somebody who suffers that type of condition. People are totally responsible for the consequences of those actions in those cases already; they are already responsible for the consequences of their actions for those that they may not see in the back of a car.
What is the difference between the consequences that will be suffered by a reckless driver who, having caused an accident as a consequence of his recklessness, injures people in that car, perhaps kills a one-month old baby on the back seat of the car, and the consequences that will be suffered by a reckless driver who causes an accident which results in the termination of a pregnancy of a seven-month pregnant woman in the car? What is the difference? What is the difference if, through his culpable driving, an old woman on the back seat, who would otherwise escape injury unscathed, suffers a heart attack because of a weakened condition? The culpable driver did not know that that woman had a condition but the culpable driver will be held accountable under existing law.
Therefore we are very, very disappointed that the Attorney-General would seek to take those protections and those provisions out of his bill. We are also disappointed that the civil liberties council of the ACT should have pressured the Attorney-General to weaken his bill. It is perplexing that the civil liberties council should seek or pressure to have the
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