Page 217 - Week 01 - Thursday, 16 February 2006
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privately underwritten, ensuring the cost of these claims is met by employers and not transferred to taxpayers.
The bill introduces a requirement for insurers to disclose to their clients the component of their premium that is attributable to the costs of funding the liabilities of the fund. This will improve the transparency of these costs and enable the employers to identify costs to their businesses that are attributable to other employers failing to take out workers compensation insurance. When the cost of employers failing to maintain workers compensation insurance is identified, employers and employer groups may more actively encourage other employers to maintain insurance.
The bill also ensures that the administration of the fund reflects the changes made to improve the efficiency and transparency of the administration of the supplementation fund, following the Auditor-General’s report. The bill establishes a tripartite advisory committee with members nominated by employers, employees and authorised insurers. The advisory committee will oversee the operations of the default insurance fund, providing advice to the fund manager and the minister regarding its administration.
The workers compensation scheme aims to reduce the costs to all parties of workplace injury through the implementation of early intervention and injury management. The bill strengthens that strategy by ensuring that workers whose claims are met by the default insurance fund will be provided with similar injury management and return-to-work services available to other injured workers. Consistent with the objective of injury management, the bill also clarifies that employers may consult with a variety of people when developing a return-to-work program for an injured worker. This will allow employers to utilise a broad range of expertise to provide injured workers with an effective and timely return-to-work program.
The bill also clarifies the obligations of employers, employees and insurers under the act and encourages all parties to meet their obligations in a timely manner. This not only increases the administrative efficiency of the act but further supports early intervention and injury management. The bill also provides a strong incentive for workers to make compensation claims in a timely manner by requiring that they make claims within seven days of the injury. If workers do not comply with this provision, insurers are able to cease weekly benefits until a claim is made. This will not apply where the worker is unable to make the claim within the time due to circumstances beyond his or her control.
The bill also provides protection for insurers and employers in a small number of cases where injured workers refuse to attend a medical assessment within the first 28 days of the claim. Currently this means that insurers must accept these claims and are unable to recover benefits paid to the worker even if subsequent medical evidence indicates that the injury did not require compensation. In these circumstances, insurers are also required to give eight weeks notice before they can terminate weekly payments. The bill will allow an insurer to cease weekly payments where the insurer takes reasonable steps to obtain a medical assessment and the worker has failed to attend the assessment within 28 days. Again, this will not apply if the worker is unable to attend due to reasons outside his or her control.
The act currently requires insurers to pay invoices for services within 30 days of the service being provided. This has caused difficulty for insurers in situations where the
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