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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 10 Hansard (29 August) . . Page.. 3591 ..

MR HUMPHRIES (continuing):

looking at quality, is it perhaps looking at the political line which a particular public servant might represent in office? The question also arises: where is the accountability? This is an all care, no responsibility approach that contradicts the more accountable, non-politicised theme of the rest of the bill.

It is difficult to achieve transparency in employment arrangements, particularly those that attract community attention. In this context, who would apply for chief executive jobs in the ACT in the face of this kind of parliamentary scrutiny and involvement?

Mr Osborne's amendments replacing Assembly endorsement of chief executive appointments following a report from the relevant Assembly committee, with possible disallowance under the Statutory Appointments Act, do not address the key issue. Public service appointments based on merit should not be subject to parliamentary involvement. They are different from ministerial statutory appointments. They are different also to the arrangements that apply in the United States, where appointments to senior positions in an administration are expressly and patently political. When a particular administration dies, then so do the public sector appointments which have been made by it. But that is not the Australian way. It is not the way in which our public service has been constructed. I do not think we should change our system without very extensive and very careful debate.

There is more political debate today about the public service and the quality of public administration. Public servants occasionally get drawn into this debate. It is not sensible to say this is the result of executive contract arrangements. We may find that tenured chief executives will still be subject to the same public and political focus because of wider community, media and political change.

There is a provision in the legislation for the appointment of a senior appointments commissioner. The government has great concern about the approach that is evidenced in this appointment. The method of appointment and terms and conditions of the commissioner are more akin to an external audit role with ultimate responsibilities to the parliament. I think this is not appropriate for a public official who has to work within the ACT public service, which still essentially is meant to serve the government of the day.

Mr Osborne's amendment to make the commissioner subject to ministerial direction on general or particular matters is no help. In fact, it is not clear what kind of appointment is envisaged. On the one hand, the bill sets up a complex procedure for promoting independence in executive employment; on the other, it makes the key statutory office subject to ministerial direction. If, after this debate, it was decided that some important role in respect of executive employment were desirable, that would be better progressed by enhancing the current commissioner's role rather than reactively creating a new statutory role.

As will be obvious from these comments, Mr Osborne's amendment that prohibits a dual appointment as Commissioner for Public Administration and statutory appointments commissioner is going in the wrong direction. Why create an extensive new statutory role when there is arguably no need for it.

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