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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 10 Hansard (29 August) . . Page.. 3590 ..

MR HUMPHRIES (continuing):

of process is more likely to provide the answer-not reacting to an extreme position in the face of criticism or concerns.

The bill, as introduced, provides independence in the employment of individuals to chief executives-new section 62B-potentially removing the capacity of the government to implement service-wide employment policies. An equivalent provision in the New Zealand State Sector Act relates to public service independence in employment decisions about individuals. Failure to see why this is properly framed in this way points to a blurring between two quite distinct issues-independence in public service management of employment, and responsibility and responsiveness to government in matters of policy.

Mr Osborne's amendments now limit this to independence in selection matters only. This is obviously a better approach. However, resolving this issue does not resolve the wider questions of responsibility and accountability. These are issues of substance and require wider discussion before parliamentary debate over drafting and specific clauses.

Public sector employment arrangements should express the desired accountability arrangements, but they need to address that openly. This bill works the other way. It institutes a particular approach to employment, and governance is the side effect of that.

Mr Speaker, let me turn to the issue of politicisation that is covered in this bill. One of the goals of this bill is to bring greater transparency and accountability to the senior executive employment regime to remove the capacity for political appointments in the public service. Obviously, behind this lies a set of beliefs about politicisation of any public service with executive contract employment.

It is ironic that the proposed Assembly veto over chief executive employment as set out in the bill as introduced conflicts fundamentally with the stated goal of rebuilding a non-political, merit-based service. The stated purpose of these arrangements in the bill, in conjunction with the tenure provisions, was to permit out-of-favour chief executives to wait out the tide of ministerial disfavour. These arrangements simply transfer that source of potential disfavour to the parliament.

The amendments circulated by Mr Osborne modify Assembly intervention in respect of some issues. However, the bill, if amended, will still make chief executive appointments disallowable by the Assembly through the operation of the Statutory Appointments Act. More worrying is the amendment that provides capacity for the Assembly to direct a minister to remove a chief executive from office on the grounds of misbehaviour or physical or mental incapacity. I think we really are mixing the streams here, in a way that does promote politicisation of the public service.

What mechanisms will guarantee non-partisan actions by this parliament? If you accuse a government of being political-I suppose that is a fair accusation for the most part-it is equally fair to accuse the parliament of being political. As Mr Osborne said when he introduced the bill, a parliamentary committee should not feel responsible for the quality of chief executives in exercising its power of veto over appointments and terminations. If that is the case, if an Assembly committee looking at these issues is not responsible for quality, then the question arises: what exactly is the benefit of these arrangements? What is an Assembly committee looking at these matters supposed to be doing? If it is not

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