Page 3641 - Week 12 - Wednesday, 20 October 1993
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MS SZUTY (11.15): Madam Speaker, the Bail (Amendment) Bill 1992 that Mr Humphries introduced was introduced at a time when the Government had recently brought into statutory law common law practices of the courts in granting bail. A gap was subsequently found in the legislation which, after its passage, prevented courts from refusing bail to people who had breached domestic violence protection orders. This anomaly was rectified in December of last year, as Mr Connolly has outlined this morning. The first of Mr Humphries's Bail (Amendment) Bills proposes to refuse bail for people who are accused of an offence if at the time of that offence they were on bail in relation to another offence. This would apply in all cases unless exceptional circumstances apply.
Madam Speaker, Mr Humphries, in proposing his amendment Bill, was responding to a need he had perceived in the community at that time, and that need was for members of the community to feel protected from violent offenders in particular. In a perfect society people would not be accused of offences unless there was overwhelming evidence against them. Indeed, in a perfect society those who offended against their fellow citizens by violating their person or possessions would immediately admit guilt and the process of justice would be simple and straightforward. However, in these times this is not what occurs. People can be arrested or charged on what appears to be circumstantial evidence, the guilty may or may not admit to their crimes, and of course the court system operates on the basic principle that a person is innocent of the crimes they are accused of until they are proven guilty.
Therefore, if the only thing preventing a person from being allowed bail is a former accusation of the commission of a crime, that person must be given the benefit of the doubt. Until the court hears the evidence only an accusation exists, and I am not prepared to advocate curtailing a person's liberty on the basis of an accusation. Of course, many people in the community feel that if someone is accused of a crime they must be guilty to some degree, particularly in circumstances where police arrest offenders and retain them in custody for the courts to determine the question of bail. To consider that this is an indication of guilt is not a defensible position. There must be more than an accusation before a person is deemed to be guilty of a crime.
The amendment Bill before us today does not make the distinction between being accused of a similar crime or of a completely different crime. If, for example, a person was arrested and charged with, say, a break and enter offence and given bail, and then was arrested and charged with another unrelated offence on which they had to be brought before the court for determination of bail, the passage of this amendment Bill would compel the court to order that bail be refused. Not only would this have consequences for the many people who are charged with offences that are not proceeded with, that they are found not guilty of or that are delayed because of difficulty with coordinating witnesses and reports, but also there would be an enormous cost to the community in detaining people charged with more than one offence. Indeed, one could speculate as to what size the Belconnen Remand Centre would have to be to accommodate the numbers. There is a further provision in the amendment Bill that bail can be granted in such cases where there are exceptional circumstances, but who decides what are exceptional circumstances? Madam Speaker, to force the court's hand by stating that bail is refused because a person is charged with more than one offence which leads to detention in custody and appearance before the courts for determination of bail is to remove the fairness of the current court system. It removes the principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty.
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