Page 2691 - Week 09 - Wednesday, 25 August 1993

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MOTOR TRAFFIC (ALCOHOL AND DRUGS)
(AMENDMENT) BILL (NO
. 3) 1993

Debate resumed from 17 June 1993, on motion by Mr Connolly:

That this Bill be agreed to in principle.

Question resolved in the affirmative.

Bill agreed to in principle.

Leave granted to dispense with the detail stage.

Bill agreed to.

SUPREME COURT (AMENDMENT) BILL 1993

Debate resumed from 17 June 1993, on motion by Mr Connolly:

That this Bill be agreed to in principle.

MR HUMPHRIES (4.08): This Bill is all about juries and the value of 12 good men and true, as they say in the old language, who are appointed to decide the guilt or innocence of members of the public who are charged with certain offences. I must say that having 12 good men and true would be a very great relief after the spectacle of the rabble opposite who acted, I think, in a disgraceful fashion. Far be it from me, however, to reflect on a vote of the Assembly. I will comment on the Bill's provisions.

This Bill, although it was not mentioned by the Attorney-General when he introduced it, follows a reform inaugurated by the Greiner Government in New South Wales back in 1990, although I also note from my research that this suggestion that we should be able to dispense with jury trials and go for trials by judge alone in certain circumstances was, as far as I am able to determine, first proposed by the then Attorney-General of Victoria, the Hon. Haddon Storey, back in the 1970s. He suggested that there should be certain cases in which an accused person could waive their right to be tried by a judge and jury. So this suggestion has been tossed around for some time. It has been a practice in New South Wales now for two or three years and we could support the idea, the contention, that there should be some use of that provision here in the ACT for a number of reasons.

The Bill allows the accused to elect to have a trial by judge alone rather than trial by judge and jury. It also, incidentally, allows a court to deal with summary offences with which a person is at the same time charged - that is, at the same time as the indictable offences - at the conclusion of the trial for the indictable offences. Both provisions extend the rights of the defendant. Neither situation - that is where you can dispense with a jury or where you can have summary offences dealt with by the Supreme Court - can ensue without the consent of the accused and it is therefore in no way a derogation from the rights of the accused.


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