Page 4638 - Week 13 - Tuesday, 31 October 2017
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The committee’s report sets out our views regarding the design, form, functions and powers of this body. It is presented in four parts: the context to the inquiry; views from submitters; views put forward in hearings; and, finally, the views of the committee and its recommendations. The report makes 79 recommendations relating to the ACT’s integrity framework, the jurisdiction, scope and powers of the commission, accountability and independence, staffing and resourcing, legislative application and other issues.
In considering the design of a commission, the committee is of the view that the solution that would best suit the ACT should draw from different institutional options as a way to respond to our specific needs and context. The framework that the committee has set out is informed on a foundational basis by the New South Wales ICAC model. It also draws a range of key distinguishing features from other models, particularly the Victorian IBAC model.
The committee is of the view that the primary objective of a standing ACT independent integrity body should be to investigate, expose and prevent corruption and foster public confidence in the integrity of the ACT government. With this purpose in mind, the committee has recommended that the body should have the following functions: investigation, referral and reporting; corruption prevention, including research and risk mitigation; and public education.
The committee also looked into the issues of jurisdiction and scope and formed the view that the substantive jurisdiction of a commission should cover all public officials. This includes all persons receiving a salary, wages or other payment from the ACT government service, its statutory authorities, agencies or boards. This would also include parties delivering contracted work or services on behalf of government.
Furthermore, the committee formed the view that whilst the focus of an ACIC would primarily be on public officials, its jurisdiction should expand to cover third parties where the conduct of those parties could impact on public administration or would likely threaten public confidence in the integrity of government. Examples of this might include blackmailing or defrauding a public official and collusion by tenderers for government contracts.
Another key question that was presented to the committee was whether an ACT ACIC should have oversight over ACT Policing officers. The committee notes that an oversight arrangement for ACT Policing already exists in the commonwealth sphere. The committee also recognises the concerns raised by ACT Policing that it would be difficult to delineate between the functions of ACT Policing and the broader AFP for the purpose of an ACT ACIC without the support of a commonwealth policy.
However, the committee formed the view that the commission should have oversight over police officers funded to deliver services by and to the ACT taxpayer and community. The committee considers that there are gaps and vulnerabilities in the current ACT Policing integrity framework, both real and perceived, and that these cannot be addressed satisfactorily by strengthening existing measures, such as reporting requirements.
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