Page 3053 - Week 09 - Tuesday, 22 August 2017
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The 2011 procedures are summarised as follows: the service responsible for incident control in relation to fires in the BAZ used to be decided by the officers in charge on scene from each service, liaising with each other and jointly determining the priorities and strategies for the management of the fire, including incident control. If agreement were not quickly achieved on scene, the officer in charge on scene from each service would immediately contact their respective chief officer. The chief officers would then liaise with each other and appoint an incident controller and other key incident management team, or IMT, roles as required.
If, in the opinion of either of the chief officers, the fire was likely to escalate or had escalated into a complex incident threatening life, property or significant environmental assets, or multiple incidents were occurring that may compete for resources, the fire would be under the control of an off-scene located IMT. If an IMT were not in place, the chief officers would liaise with each other and appoint an incident controller and other key IMT roles as required, taking into consideration the risk profile of the incident.
In the event that agreement was not reached between the chief officers, the commissioner would appoint an incident controller and other key IMT roles as required. It is easy to see why the review found that the old procedures from 2011 were cumbersome and potentially problematic. So thank you to the then shadow spokesperson and ACT Greens spokesperson for telling us exactly how it used to be, and thank you to the previous Assembly for the passage of the bill last year.
The amendments have now made the accountabilities very clear. They clarify that ACT Fire & Rescue is responsible for the complex hazards of a large city in a built-up area and the ACT Rural Fire Service remains responsible for any fire incidents in bushland, such as parks, reserves and farms. The Emergencies Act ensures that the roles and functions of the ESA commissioner and the chief officers are clear not only in times of emergency but in training, planning and community education roles.
As I advised the Assembly on 7 June 2017, I was made aware of an administrative error in amending the Emergencies Act 2016, which was to delete section 29(3)(d), giving the chief officer of ACT Fire & Rescue responsibility for operational planning in the BAZ. While this Assembly debated and passed this change on the basis that the amendment had been made as intended, the administrative error meant that the legislation does not reflect the Assembly’s intent.
This is an oversight that will be corrected through the next Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Bill, scheduled to be introduced in the Assembly in September this year. Despite this oversight, the Emergencies Act has been applied as intended, following the amendments made to the legislation last year. The feedback I am receiving from the people that matter most—those who apply the legislation and seek direction in the event of an emergency incident—is that these arrangements are working extremely well. This was highlighted during the most recent 2016-17 bushfire season, when both ACT fire services worked together collaboratively and cohesively.
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