Page 1423 - Week 05 - Tuesday, 9 May 2017
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . . Video
The initial impact of this event was an interruption of electrical supply to lifts in building 1, the tower block; the reception foyer, building 2; clinical and administrative areas, building 3; and the residences, building 5. The lifts were initially impacted because of the electrical switchboard involved. The affected lifts were all empty at the time of the incident.
ACT Fire & Rescue were contacted immediately and quickly arrived on site to deal with the incident. A forward command centre was established at 6.30 pm and, following assessment by ACT Fire & Rescue and hospital authorities, a decision was made to isolate mains power to the main electrical switchboard which enabled the fire to be safely and completely extinguished.
As a result of this, power to the electrical switchboards in the main electrical switchboard room was shut off, which impacted temporarily on a number of clinical and non-clinical buildings across the campus including: building 1, the tower block; building 2, the reception foyer; building 3, clinical and administrative areas; building 4, the ANU Medical School; building 5, the residences; building 6, the medihotel and administrative areas; building 7, drug and alcohol inpatient area; building 8, pain management unit; building 9, doctors’ residences; and buildings 23 and 24, administrative areas. Emergency lighting was triggered in all affected areas.
The temporary loss of power from the building 2 electrical main switchboard lasted from 7 pm that night to 2 am the following morning. Emergency lighting remained on throughout this period in most parts of the hospital, with the exception of on two floors of the tower block. Battery backup for all critical machines activated at the time of the power loss. During this time, the Canberra Hospital emergency department continued to treat major trauma, obstetric emergencies and severe paediatric cases, with all other local cases directed to Calvary hospital.
The hospital emergency operations centre was activated at 7.30 pm. The decision to activate the HEOC was based on the scale of the incident and the available information on the emergency. The HEOC focused on collecting information to inform decision-making. At 9 pm, Dr Andrew Pengilley as the health controller established an incident management team and activated the ACT emergency coordination centre, the ECC, at ESA headquarters in Fairbairn.
The health controller liaised with the HEOC to provide government resources, forward planning and regular updates to the security and emergency management senior officials group, or SEMSOG. The Director-General of ACT Health attended SEMSOG along with other senior ACT government directorate officials throughout the incident. The ECC was staffed by liaison officers from ACT government directorates to provide support as required.
To support activities at the Canberra Hospital during the incident approximately 112 staff were recalled to the Canberra Hospital, and two nurses from each ward were asked to remain for an extra two hours. Patients were advised of the status throughout the incident by staff on duty at TCH in consultation with the HEOC.
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . . Video