Page 2699 - Week 08 - Wednesday, 10 August 2016
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Dot point 3 of paragraph 5.55 states:
information tabled in the Legislative Assembly on 17 September 2009, prepared by ACTEW, advised that ACTEW Board papers for the meeting on 26 August 2009 had been delivered to departmental representatives on Friday 21 August 2009 and that the ACTEW Managing Director had ‘met with the heads of both Chief Minister’s Department and Treasury to discuss the proposed costings provided in the Board papers.’ (It is not clear as to when these meetings occurred);
To recap, we know from the Auditor-General’s report that throughout 2008 and 2009 the government knew the costs of the project were increasing. They also knew that the cost as of 21 August was going to be significantly higher than what was in the public realm.
The reason I said that the date of September 2009 was important is because according to paragraph 5.53 the then planning minister announced the use of call-in powers for the enlarged Cotter Dam project on the morning of 26 August 2009. So it seems we have a situation where the government knew the cost of the dam was going up markedly. The Auditor-General says they were kept alert to cost increases in 2008 and 2009. ACTEW had advised on Friday, 21 August the Chief Minister’s department and Treasury that the cost was significantly higher than what was in the public realm, yet the government went ahead with the call-in anyway. That goes to the integrity of this government.
It is also worth noting that paragraph 5.75 states:
The geological condition of the Enlarged Cotter Dam site became better known as geotechnical surveys were conducted between 2007 and September 2009. A statement in a September 2009 newspaper article, quoting the then Managing Director of ACTEW saying that the cost had increased due to ‘… going down about another 9m on what we anticipated for the foundations’ is not supported by geotechnical investigations that were undertaken.
We have a situation where they said steel was increasing and that that was driving up the cost of the dam, and that was wrong. They said that they had to go down another nine metres in excavation, but that was not supported by geotechnical investigations that were undertaken. In addition, the costs were increasing throughout 2008 and 2009 and the government knew about it—the shareholders knew about it—yet Minister Barr, who I believe was then the planning minister, went ahead and called in the project and did not allow proper scrutiny before the dam had been given the green light.
This is significant because we have another serious project on the table at the moment. With the light rail project I think we are seeing some of these issues revisited. It seems we may not have learned these lessons with regard to the bulk water alliance and, in particular, the enlarged Cotter Dam project with regard to how we are going about managing the light rail project. I hope the government, through this Auditor-General’s report into the bulk water alliance as part of the Icon portfolio, is able to make sure lessons have been learned. (Second speaking period taken.)
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