Page 1254 - Week 04 - Thursday, 26 March 2015
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MR CORBELL (Molonglo—Deputy Chief Minister, Attorney-General, Minister for Health, Minister for the Environment and Minister for Capital Metro) (4.46): To address a number of those matters raised by Mr Rattenbury, let me say that this is a complex issue, but it does not mean that we should not look closely at the capacity for improvements in the way trials are conducted and the timely and expeditious discharge of the business of the court, and identify where there are hindrances to that being able to be facilitated.
This is not about assisting the prosecution. I do not accept that argument. It is about assisting the court. It is about recognising that the business of the court and its ability to narrow the issues in dispute as quickly as possible to allow more focus to be put on those matters in dispute in a criminal trial are of benefit to all parties. That is the rationale behind this proposed amendment and the amendment in the substantive bill itself.
The argument that compulsory pre-trial disclosure infringes the fundamental principle of the right to silence or the right against self-incrimination has been rejected by a number of learned authorities. It is worth highlighting that the United Kingdom Royal Commission on Criminal Justice did not accept that argument when it looked at these provisions, and two human rights compliant jurisdictions, jurisdictions with explicit charters of rights in the statute book—the United Kingdom and Victoria—have both adopted some level of pre-trial disclosure obligation on the accused.
The proposal here in the ACT is modest in comparison with pre-trial disclosure obligations in other jurisdictions, but I believe it has significant benefit for the conduct of criminal trials as a whole and the ability to have all relevant matters brought to them in an early and timely way.
The amendment before us today makes it explicitly clear that there are protections against self-incrimination and that those should be explicitly stated in this act as well as in the broader provisions of the Evidence Act that the court would otherwise rely upon.
It is also worth highlighting, as I have highlighted to the bar and to Mr Rattenbury, that the DPP is in the process of, first of all, updating his guidelines in relation to prosecution and republishing them. And he is proposing to make specific guidelines in relation to disclosure. That is a welcome step and I believe those two things in combination—that is, this amendment and the DPP’s commitment to do that—will provide sufficient assurance that there are adequate and proper protections that still protect the absolute rights of the accused whilst facilitating the expeditious discharge of business in the court and for trials to proceed in a timely manner.
So I acknowledge Mr Rattenbury’s comments, but I think that on balance we have an appropriate approach in relation to this amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Bill, as a whole, as amended, agreed to.
Bill, as amended, agreed to.
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