Page 3205 - Week 08 - Wednesday, 22 August 2012
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The Auditor-General found that the Project was not effectively managed to bring it to completion on time (within the planned time frame) and on budget (for the budgeted cost).
Then there is a list of the shortcomings, which include issues concerning project management, risk management and record-keeping. A key shortcoming found by the Auditor-General was the failure to implement an appropriate project governance or oversight arrangement. This project seemed to have a life of its own because nobody was in control, nobody was in charge, nobody was making sure it happened.
Paragraph 3.8 states:
The Committee reiterates the comments and recommendations it made in its report entitled Review of Auditor-General’s Report No 7 of 2008: Proposal for a gas-fired power station and data centre—site selection process concerning improving future cross-agency, service-wide or whole-of-government work in the ACT public sector.
It would appear from 2008 through to 2012 that the government has learnt nothing—nothing at all. These are the same sorts of shortcomings and government process that PAC had to raise in 2008 with the power station, and here we are doing them again with the pond.
Page 17 states:
The Auditor-General was of the view that the impact of these risks on the Project was underestimated. In particular, knowledge of and understanding of these risks was not adequately appreciated by Government agencies involved and accordingly was not reflected in the Project design and cost estimates.
Even though she says earlier they were well aware of what these risks were, they were ignored. It continues:
The Committee notes that the Project had to be significantly redesigned to address escalating costs attributable to these risks. The completion of a revised, smaller capacity pond was approved by the responsible Minister in January 2011 with work recommencing on the site on 8 March 2011. At the time of the Audit report, the redesigned project was estimated to cost:
... $43.4 million …
We then go on to say in paragraph 3.12:
However, the Committee further notes that the 2012–13 Budget appropriated a further $15 million to finish the Project. At July 2012, it appears that the cost overrun for the Project is now estimated to be $58 million, close to three times the original budgeted cost of $20.8 million.
It is important that we get these projects right. We only have limited funds that the taxpayer applies to us, and when we have failures of this kind it is the taxpayer that is
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