Page 4008 - Week 11 - Wednesday, 16 Sept 2009

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eliminate bushfires; hence, it is incumbent on us to minimise as far as we can the risk of bushfires occurring.

The second set of comments details the approach of governments to mitigating the potential for bushfires. The commonwealth and state governments, through the Council of Australian Governments, have been involved in two significant reports in recent times on this issue. The first report was the Natural disasters in Australia: reforming mitigation, relief and recovery arrangements report, prepared in 2002. The second report was the National inquiry on bushfire mitigation and management, prepared in 2004, written by Mr Stuart Ellis, Professor Peter Kanowski and Professor Rob Whelan. I will call this the Ellis report, as the chairman of the inquiry was Stuart Ellis.

One of the important outcomes from these reports is the increasing stress that is now being placed on being prepared for disasters and emergencies. The report on natural disasters called on all governments to engage in a “paradigm shift” and to embrace mitigation, rather than focusing on recovery from natural disasters. While all levels of government have an interest in mitigating the effects of disasters, this report noted that “state and territory governments have the principal role in natural disaster mitigation”. This report also emphasised that the paradigm shift in focus needed to encompass “increased, cost-effective investment in disaster”.

The commonwealth government recognises the importance of having the best possible preparations in place for disasters. The commonwealth provides resources, including funding, to states and territories to enhance preparations for disasters through such programs as the bushfire mitigation program and the national aerial fire-fighting strategy. The evidence that has been accumulated over many years, in a large number of expert reports, is quite clear. It is essential to have good preparations that are intended to reduce the risk of disaster—in this case, bushfires—as far as feasible.

The problem we face in all of that is complacency—complacency that what we put in place after the last bushfire will help us with the next one. Unfortunately, complacency is always with us. The Ellis report developed what it called “the bushfire cycle”. This cycle, according to the Ellis report, has a series of actions that proceed from a major bushfire event. You have the event; it is followed by accusations and blame; you then have a government inquiry; as a result of that inquiry, you have an increase in funding for emergency services; you initially have community compliance; you then have the coronial inquests and the recommendations that are made; then there is a sense of growing complacency that leads up to the next major bushfire disaster.

In many ways, you could say that is what has occurred in the ACT. We did have a major event; there were questions asked; there was a government inquiry that had recommendations that led to an increase in emergency services funding; and, again, there was initial community compliance. We then had a coronial inquest, with further consequences. But over recent years there has been a growing sense of complacency, particularly inside the government.

The Ellis report notes that the bushfire cycle can have periods extending from as much as 20 years to 50 years. So it is easy to see how complacency can develop when


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