Page 3743 - Week 10 - Wednesday, 26 August 2009
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both in relation to the activities regulated and the organisations and individuals monitored and investigated.
The commission and its authorised officers have substantial powers of investigation and enforcement. If Mr Smyth were to listen, he would find that they are actually much wider than those of the Auditor-General in relation to this matter. He has the powers to serve notice on individuals, to provide information or attend and give evidence on oath or affirmation, to enter and inspect any premises at any reasonable time and remove anything that might be used as evidence, to require any person on such premises to answer questions or provide documents in their possession, and to conduct searches of premises as authorised by warrant and seize and remove evidence. These powers extend well beyond the usual powers of most government bodies. This is for very good reason. According to the act, the commission must perform its functions in a way that best promotes public interest. It therefore needs these broad powers to do so.
The commission consists of five members, one of whom must be the Chief Executive Officer of the commission, who must also be a public servant. Otherwise, the members are independent and their appointment is subject to scrutiny by the relevant Assembly standing committee.
The Auditor-General exercises power only in respect of territory agencies, including territory-owned corporations. The auditor’s power to obtain information is limited to a written request, although the auditor may require a person to answer a question under oath or affirmation. The auditor or an authorised person may enter a premises at any reasonable time, provided that premises is occupied by a territory entity. The auditor does not have the power to demand a person on such premises answer questions or produce documents in their possession, nor can the auditor conduct searches authorised under a warrant. By contrast, the commission can.
I will be interested in Mr Smyth’s analysis of that. His entire argument seems to rest on the point that I could dismiss the Chief Executive Officer, despite the fact that the Chief Executive Officer is one of five members of the commission. So I cannot dismiss them and, if you read the legislation, Mr Smyth, you would actually understand that.
The proposed sale of the Canberra Labor Club Group, if it proceeded, could only be to another gaming machine licensee in the territory; thus the machines would stay in the territory for the benefit of the community. The surplus from any sale of the Labor Club Group would be a matter for the members of the club to determine, as reflected in the club’s constitution. I think if you look at other clubs around the territory, that is a similar process—that all are established under their articles or constitution—and it is a matter for the members of those clubs to determine any proceeds of any transfer of licences.
The Gaming Machine Act provides that a club’s gaming machine licence must identify its influential persons, who must undergo suitability checks undertaken by the Gambling and Racing Commission. In addition, it is a requirement of the act that a club’s management committee must have complete control over the club’s business
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