Page 3657 - Week 10 - Wednesday, 26 August 2009
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day as different circumstances will require different strategies. The government of the day will determine what is appropriate for these programs.
Members will be aware of the interim report of the 2009 Victorian bushfire royal commission that was released last week. While this is an interim report, it contains much useful information and learning from the tragic bushfires in Victoria this February. I would like to draw out of that report some comments about warnings. The commission noted that it was motivated to have a lengthy examination of bushfire warnings issued in February 2009. Chapter 4 is an extensive commentary on bushfire warnings.
The commission described the consideration of bushfire warnings by successive inquiries, reviews and reports as a well-trodden path. Indeed, as I have noted, there have been innumerable reports into bushfires in Australia and the consideration of warnings has been a common theme. The commission sought to identify what constitutes a good bushfire warning. In analysing this issue, the commission draws on a considerable body of evidence and information from Australia and other countries.
The commission made other observations and, for instance, notes that AFAC, the Australian Fire Authorities Council, has developed a draft position on warnings. While observing that the AFAC position paper was first drafted in 2005 and modified in 2007, it still remains a draft. I would observe that this approach is symptomatic of the Australian approach that we just cannot seem to get things finalised and implemented when it comes to bushfires.
There is much other valuable commentary on warnings in the commission’s report that will need to be considered. And I commend chapter 4 of the report to members for their reading.
Much of the angst in Canberra after the 2003 fires, and indeed in Victoria after February fires, was over the lack of warnings. In fact, the interim report of the Victorian royal commission referred to the issue of warnings contained in a considerable number of the submissions. Indeed, it was the equal second most talked about thing in the submissions. Fuel reduction and prescribed burnings were mentioned in 485 submissions; fire warnings were mentioned in 430; along with fire preparedness in 430 submissions. The question “Why weren’t we told, why weren’t we warned?” rang large in Canberra in 2003. Unfortunately, six years later it still rings large in the Australian community—unfortunately, this time, in Victoria.
It is my hope that this bill will provide encouragement and some impetus to implementing a uniform national system of bushfire warnings. I would be delighted if the ACT could provide such a lead, particularly after we had so much learning about bushfire warnings after our bushfire disaster of 2003.
It is time that this country had a serious discussion about how we approach bushfires. Bushfires do not happen every 100 years or every 50 years. Somewhere in Australia almost every year a community suffers the impact of bushfires. And yet we seem to always reach the position that they are somehow unassailable, somehow unstoppable on the day. The work has to commence before the day. It cannot be left until that morning.
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