Page 3479 - Week 09 - Thursday, 20 August 2009
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possible to lay down in code of conduct guidelines the requirements and obligations of ministers in relation to private interests, assets, gifts, travel and so forth, the obligations of ministers in relation to their discretionary powers in determining outcomes for local communities, individuals, organisations and companies are much harder to monitor.
I give as an example the call-in powers of the planning minister where he is able to call in, with very little explanation, a multimillion dollar project of significant impact to the community, yet has to declare a movie or football ticket on a register. Indeed, the code of conduct, as it exists, devotes more space to the housekeeping issues than recognising the importance of proper decision making on behalf of the people of Canberra.
The code is not a law and can be altered, amended or interpreted by the Chief Minister as he sees fit. He is judge and jury on breaches and can ignore it or interpret it loosely and from a partisan perspective. The code reads in paragraph 4 of the preamble:
Ministers are personally responsible for complying with the Code and for justifying their actions and conduct in Cabinet and the Legislative Assembly. It is not intended that issues relating to compliance or non-compliance with this Code be determined or reviewed by any court, tribunal or other body.
It is hard to see how a code of this nature will ensure the highest standards of governance for the people of Canberra. I quote Professor John Uhr of the Australian National University, who said:
Ministers belong to the last profession in public life which seems to have … no impartial adjudicator and no way of resolving disputes within their own group.
Should the Assembly be asking whether the Chief Minister, from whatever side of politics, should have sole oversight of the code of conduct and how potential conflict of interests can be managed? Professor John Uhr has made suggestions on basic methods of implementing ministerial accountability. He has suggested that the parliament, rather than the ministry, should determine the ministerial code of conduct and that the system also needs an external investigative mechanism, perhaps such as a commissioner of integrity and/or the appointment of an independent officer to ensure compliance with the code of conduct. Such models exist in overseas parliaments.
The Assembly could also consider reforms made in the federal parliament to further improve ministerial accountability by implementing a lobbyist register where lobbyists would be listed on a public register before accessing ministers. The reforms of the federal code place a 12-month ban on departing ministers having business dealings with MPs and public servants on any matter they dealt with in their official capacity during their last 18 months in office.
I also refer to the federal parliament’s actions in 2000 when the Senate’s finance and public administration legislation committee sought to set ethical standards for all members. Indeed, it agreed that the commonwealth parliament should take responsibility for establishing its own standards of conduct and adopt an ethics regime for ministers and members that would have as its cornerstone a workable and enforceable code of conduct. While the Prime Minister at the time ignored the
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