Page 2800 - Week 08 - Wednesday, 24 June 2009
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It is revealing to relate the Auditor-General’s resources to the task at hand. In the 2007-08 financial year, the ACT Auditor-General provided audit reports on 68 agencies or particular funds. In addition, some agencies may require more than one audit. For instance, four audit opinions were provided for Actew and ActewAGL. A number of audits were provided for entities falling within the Treasury portfolio.
Ms Pham told the estimates committee that she had a list of 100 prospective performance audits. If there are seven such audits each year, these will take 14 years—yes, at the current rate, 14 years—to conduct. And that is without considering any requests for audits from members of the Assembly or indeed from the community. And the Chief Minister wants to reduce the number of performance audits, because he cannot reduce the number of mandated financial audits.
It is interesting that, when you look at the government’s response to the recommendation of the estimates committee, not only are the government intent on reducing the funding for the Auditor-General’s Office, they also now want to attack her independence in another way, by seeking to guide what performance audits she will undertake. The paragraph above the recommendation on page 11 of the government’s response is interesting. I will read it:
The government intends to seek external advice on a methodology to support the Auditor General identifying and prioritising activities for the performance audit program. Following consideration by the government, this advice will be provided to the Public Accounts Committee for wider discussion.
So not only are we going to attack her funding, the basis of where she works, we are now going to seek to be able to direct what the independent auditor can and will do. I suggest that the Chief Minister read section 9 of part 3 of the Auditor-General Act, which says:
Independence
The auditor-general is not subject to direction by the Executive or any Minister in the exercise of the functions of the auditor-general.
Again, this is what makes this position unique. So we need to ask whether this approach to determining the budget and the work program of the Auditor-General is followed anywhere else in the world. Indeed, there are two strong democracies in which this is the case. In the United Kingdom, the budget of the National Audit Office is set by the parliament and not by the government of the day. I refer members to the National Audit Office of the UK website which, again, stresses independence. It says:
The Comptroller and Auditor-General is an officer of the House of Commons—
as is the Auditor-General an officer of this Assembly—
appointed by the Queen on an address proposed by the Prime Minister with the agreement of the Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts and approved by the House of Commons.
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