Page 2337 - Week 06 - Friday, 27 June 2008
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expenditure. We want to know what that report says. When the legal affairs committee, in its inquiry, tried to obtain a copy of that report, the door was slammed in its face. What is the government hiding? What did that report have to say? Why did the CEO of JACS put a dampener on the publication of that report? We have asked these questions many times. Again, these questions were asked during estimates and there were no answers. The government is hiding something.
In the overreaction to the previous $5 million blow-outs—and there were certainly two of those in the period 2004 to 2007—it seems that the government has gone to cutting activity to save funds. A good example of this, in addition to the issues I have just covered, is the RFS volunteer strength. The RFS volunteer strength was revealed in estimates to be about 400 to 420 people—at, or even possibly below, the 2003 disaster strength. In estimates, when we asked Mr Corbell—
Mr Corbell: 440, actually.
MR PRATT: Okay, I will accept that at face value.
Mr Corbell: That was the evidence that I gave the committee, Mr Pratt.
MR PRATT: Was it really?
Mr Corbell: Yes.
MR PRATT: I will still accept it at face value. We will test that strength; we will see what the captains have to say about it. In any case, it is a very small difference, if any, over what the 2003 strength of the RFS was. And why is that? Mr Corbell also said in estimates that he was “comfortable” with that figure. We do know that the AIIMS standard for bushfire capability would indicate that the standard required in the ACT to meet a macro bushfire event requires a volunteer strength of about 700.
When we questioned Mr Corbell as to why he is not trying to build up to that 700, he said he was comfortable with the current 440 and, “By the way, we don’t have a macro event on our doorstep at this time.” What was the damn lesson we learnt coming out of 2003? The McLeod inquiry is replete on this matter, and so was Doogan; that is, in the years leading up to 2003—and the previous government had to take some of this on the shoulder as well—there was a slackness in preparing capability. There was little in the way of contingency preparation for the macro event, even with the signs in 2001 and 2002, with a very low drought index reading. Whichever way you want to analyse it, whether it be too low or too high, the fact was that it was a dreadful and deadly drought index. When coupled with a dreadful and devastating bushfire index, there was no movement by this government.
We see the same damn mistake being repeated again by this government. You have got to build capability; your capability needs to be ready to take a macro event on. It takes time to build to that. It will take time to build our volunteer force in the RFS from 440, if that is the figure that the minister is quite confident about, to a figure of 700. I do not see in this budget any attempt or intention to move quickly to build that strength to somewhere near 700. It is just not going to happen under this government, given its current attitude.
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