Page 382 - Week 02 - Tuesday, 4 March 2008
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legislation, keeping administrative staff and legal advisers busy at considerable administrative cost for a considerable period. Some agencies will be faced with a review of this kind for the very first time. Notwithstanding the delayed commencement date of 1 January 2009 for this provision, it seems doubtful that this work will be able to be done sufficiently well in that time.
Fourthly, clause 7 could have significant implications for public authorities exposed to challenges in the Supreme Court by disaffected individuals. This in turn could result in increased administrative costs for those authorities. There is a potential that it could open up a Pandora’s box. On the basis of the Canadian experience, provision of direct right of action for failures to comply with human rights law will open up all public authorities to expensive litigation for perceived wrongs.
There is a view that the potential costs of bringing a proceeding before the Supreme Court may in itself be a deterrent. Even if that view were only of a loose foundation, which I do not accept, if the case load increases there could be cost implications for the Supreme Court. Again, the question is how this will be paid for.
Fifthly, there is a potential for criminals to take advantage of this legislation, which will make life even more difficult for the police force. Police already have strict accountability processes, and this will further impact on their ability to do their job in the community and could lead to a further diminution of the central police powers to protect our community from wrongdoers. Given they are already understaffed, this could have a significant effect on their capacity to do their jobs and on morale.
Sixthly, I note that the Standing Committee on Legal Affairs, in scrutinising this bill, noted:
… there are five diversions used on the issue of whether the Supreme Court should or should not be permitted to award damages simply on the basis that there has been a contravention of human right—
as stated in the act—
in the performance of some action by a public authority.
In responding to the committee’s note, the Attorney-General simply used the divergence of view argument as justification for the approach taken not to allow the Supreme Court to award damages.
Finally, Mr Speaker, the amendment provides that an entity not caught by the definition of “public authority” can apply to the minister for a declaration that would be subject to the obligation of public authorities. Given the difficulties and shortcomings I have outlined, it is unlikely, I think, that there will be many such applications made.
The Human Rights Commission intends to engage in an awareness campaign, building on extensive training materials, to assist agencies to understand their obligations under this bill and the act generally. Whilst I heartily commend the
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