Page 84 - Week 01 - Wednesday, 28 February 2007
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fuel loads, which Mr McLeod later said were in excess of 40 tonnes per hectare in places.
After that frightening warning, what happened? Lots of people in the community started to thump the tub about our lack of bushfire preparedness. As a new member of this place, I was briefed extensively by volunteers on that lack of preparedness, especially about the threat from the perilous build-up of fuel. I received briefings from men, any one of whom had more firefighting experience than all of us in this place put together, and they highlighted dangers across the territory from the southern reaches of Namadgi to Gossen Hill and Black Mountain.
I immediately took these issues up with emergency and environmental agencies and they clearly, patiently and patronisingly told me that my concerns were wrong, exaggerated or already being addressed. Mr Pratt, with characteristic gusto, took up the issues as well. I remember him being pooh-poohed in this place on countless occasions for being alarmist. I also vividly remember a day in November 2002 when Mr Pratt and I received a briefing from the head of the bushfire and emergency services about the preparedness for the 2002-03 bushfire season. We were told that they had never been better prepared for a coming season and they had never done more hazard reduction. History and the inquiries of Mr McLeod and the coroner have certainly put paid to those claims.
In fact, the government had learnt nothing. The only benefit from the earlier fires was that there had been some hazard reduction, and what looked like a disaster in 2001 created some protection in 2003. Despite the assurances, four fires broke out on 8 January 2003 and, 10 days later, those fires came to town. It is no thanks to the Chief Minister that we were not counting suburbs rather than houses lost. Mr Speaker, why did those fires come to town, killing, injuring and destroying? One of the reasons was the failure to manage our environment, to take account of the fact that people live in proximity to bushland and therefore the bushland must be managed to protect the people. The people must be protected. Contrary to the statements made by Dr Foskey this morning, it is the contention of members on this side that when it comes to hazard reduction people come first.
For years we had lived with the illusion that we could just leave the bush and everything would be all right. We had gone so far as to say that we did not even need to maintain fire trails. In his report, Mr McLeod dwelt on the ACT’s approach to fuel reduction, saying that it had always failed in the past and had led to catastrophic events. December 2001 pointed in that direction, and the subsequent review pointed to the need to tackle hazard reduction, but little or nothing was done in the next 13 months.
The former head of the bushfire and emergency services told the coroner that our failure to respond to the recommendations of the analysis post-Christmas 2001 was a little disappointing. That was a massive understatement. Clearly, things were so far gone that hazard reduction would have been difficult, but I cannot believe that we were not able to do anything in the year following the 2001 fires. To say “We cannot burn off this week” would sound plausible, but to say “You cannot burn off this year” is a line that few people would swallow.
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