Page 2423 - Week 08 - Wednesday, 29 June 2005
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MR STANHOPE (Ginninderra—Chief minister, Attorney-General, Minister for the Environment and Minister for Arts, Heritage and Indigenous Affairs) (11.32): We have been through this debate several times. We went through it in relation to the Crimes (Abolition of Offence of Abortion) Act in 2002 and during the debate on the Human Rights Act 2004, in relation to the meaning of the right to life and choice debate—a bill almost identical to that introduced by Mr Pratt and which we debated last year—and yet the opposition is again insisting we revisit the debate.
Although Mr Pratt claims he does not wish to revisit the abortion debate, this bill does just that. As drafted, the bill opens the door and creates a real possibility to revisit the abortion debate and reproduction debates in general. It will create unnecessary angst and cause division within our community. Consistent with the 2002 proposal, Mr Pratt’s bill creates a dichotomy between the pregnant woman and her foetus by defining an unborn child as distinct from its mother. As I have told the Assembly previously, a major fault line in the spiritual, philosophical and ideological conflict in relation to the rights of women during pregnancy is the issue of whether a nascent child has a separate personality. There is no consensus in the community on this issue.
Establishing a dichotomy between mother and foetus, in the context of the Crimes Act, creates a new forum to revisit the abortion debate because it objectively forces the question: when does life begin? I have previously told Mr Pratt, and advised this Assembly, that providing a sanction for violent attacks on pregnant women should not require an ideological debate; it is an insensitive topic for use to make an ideological point. Mr Pratt claims that the purpose of the bill is to overcome an anomaly in the Crimes Act, in that an unborn child is not recognised as a person against whom an offence can be committed.
Mr Pratt acknowledged in 2002 and still acknowledges today that, in cases of violence against pregnant women, the court can take into account any injury to the unborn child in determining the sentence to impose. He maintains, however, that this is inadequate because the court can only impose a sentence up to the maximum applicable for the offence against the woman. In some cases this may be appropriate; however, in other cases where, for example, the act is particularly malicious or the assault so severe that it would attract the maximum penalty under normal circumstances, the discretion to apply a more severe penalty is removed, and the penalty that is imposed may not accurately reflect the culpability of the offender’s actions.
In his presentation speech Mr Pratt encouraged us all to look seriously at his proposal, or at least come up with an alternative, or amendments, to address the matter. The policy aim inherent in Mr Pratt’s previous bill and in this bill can be achieved without creating a new platform for the community to debate the spiritual and ideological meaning of an embryo, foetus or unborn child. Rather than trying to create an offence that divides mother and unborn child, an approach that references the offence against the mother is currently being developed by the government, as I have previously announced.
The government will introduce to the Criminal Code a number of aggravated offences relating to the loss of a mother’s pregnancy, serious harm to the pregnancy, or death or serious harm to the subsequent child. Where a factor of aggravation applies to an offence the maximum penalty for that offence would be increased. I will give some more detail
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