Page 1593 - Week 05 - Thursday, 7 April 2005
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(5) There were no 000 calls received during the period. The capacity for automatic caller identification was disrupted, however operator procedures were in place for manual identification.
(6) Comcen procedures include use of the Telstra National Relay Service to identify the location of callers in the event of failure of the automatic system or inability to speak.
(7) No rerouting of 000 calls were required. Procedures exist for rerouting of calls through to the ACT Policing Communications Centre at the Winchester Centre. This can be initiated by the ESA or by Telstra when calls are not answered within a predetermined time. A similar arrangement exists from the Police to the ESA.
(8) Identical capabilities exist at both the ESA and Police Communications Centres.
(9) The ESCC is not a recognised acronym. The ESA Communications Centre (Comcen) is the title of the facility. The 20 minute disruption to essential services resulted in the loss of several aspects of the communications systems included the computerised despatch system (CAD). Manual procedures for Comcen operations were then activated under the direction of staff. This is a normal contingency measure.
(10) The impact on operations of the ESA Comcen was minor. There was no impact on support to the community.
(11) Locations of all RFS units are always tracked manually. Locations of ACTFB units were tracked manually during the system disruption. These are normal contingency procedures. Comcen operators are able to confirm locations using voice radio communications.
(12) The ESA Comcen maintained location information of all units.
(13) The ESA Comcen maintained information on the operational status of all units.
(14) Two generators are maintained at ESA Headquarters.
(15) The 40KVA essential services generator operated on the 13 January 2005. In this instance the generator failed to provide the necessary power input to the system. The 350KVA was not required to activate.
(16) The emergency power system has worked in the past.
(17) No damage was sustained to Comcen equipment.
(18) Minor damage to equipment has been sustained in the past. Technical measures have been taken to ensure that this does not occur in the future.
(19) Functioning of the power systems have been maintained through technical support arrangements. The ESA has reviewed these arrangements and introduced a revised schedule of testing and training.
(20) Performance standards are reviewed following all testing and operational situations. This is a standard operational analysis practice for operational organisations such as the ESA. In this instance the analysis has resulted in remedial technical work to reduce the probability of a similar failure from occurring together with confirmation of Comcen procedures.
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