Page 1149 - Week 04 - Thursday, 17 March 2005
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .
Of course, where a conflict between the Bill and any right is perceived, the question would then become whether the derogation was justifiable under HRA—
Human Rights Act—
section 28, which permits of reasonable limitation to rights.
The committee commented on four issues, and I will highlight those. I think that it is important for members to do so. The first is the concept of personal injury. I will speak about that later, but I will say that in the box you will see the words, “Is the concept of ‘personal injury’ appropriately defined?” We say that that is a problem. Page 4 of the report, referring to the concept of a person’s relative, asks whether the concept of “relative” is appropriately explained in the example. There is then comment in relation to a restriction on the publicity attending a legal proceeding. The summation on that reads:
An issue arises as to whether proposed section 100 of the Act (see clause 33 of the Bill) is compatible with the “fair and public hearing” aspect of a fair trial, as that requirement is stated in HRA section 21. There may be a freedom of expression component in section 21; in any event it may be based on section 16 (2).
The qualifications in HRA section 21 (2) include recognition of “the interest of the private lives of the parties”, and this may be a basis to avoid any findings of incompatibility between proposed section 100 of the Act and HRA section 21.
Finally:
Proposed section 100 might on its face be incompatible with HRA section 21 (3). If so, the question would be whether that incompatibility was a reasonable limit that is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society: HRA section 28.
Those points were raised by the scrutiny of bills committee report into this piece of legislation. I intend to go through a number of specific sections of the act which are significant and make some comments on those. Commencing with the definition of “relative”, page 2 of the explanatory statement says:
The Bill expands the definition of domestic violence to include threats to, or acts against pets and animals; burglary; and destroying and damaging property; and the definition of “relative” to take into account the kinship and cultural ties of Aboriginal People and Torres Strait Islanders, members of communities with non-English speaking backgrounds and people with particular religious beliefs.
The Bill also expands the definition of “relevant person” to include relationships with similar dynamics to “domestic relationships”.
It also states:
Clause 8 expands the definition of “domestic violence” to include threats to, or acts against pets and animals; burglary; and destroying and damaging property.
I can say, having had some practical experience in these issues as a family lawyer and also a criminal lawyer, that that is probably a sensible addition. We will see how it pans
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .