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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2004 Week 09 Hansard (Wednesday, 18 August 2004) . . Page.. 3876 ..

Given that the rule of law and civil and political rights listed in the Human Rights Act 2004 are part of ACT law, responsibilities are already recognised. The Liberal Party admits that. When he introduced this bill, Mr Stefaniak conceded that many of the responsibilities listed are professional standards already in existence, set out in professional and other codes of ethics. While statements outlining moral and ethical principles and listing individual and community responsibilities are useful and may improve social cohesiveness, they are more appropriately contained in codes of conduct that apply to specific circumstances and activities. Morals and ethical guidelines do not function well as legislative provisions.

Using a statement such as the charter to purportedly “complement” the rights in the Human Rights Act will also create an expectation that only those who abide by the charter of responsibilities are entitled to those rights. It can be used to justify denying people their human rights because they are seen not to deserve them. Fundamental human rights are not dependent upon merit. They apply simply because you are a person. They are not simply guides to good behaviour and are appropriately the subject of legislative provisions. However, we should not be in the business of legislating ethics and morality. Ethical and moral behaviour in day-to-day activities are matters that should be based on appropriate consideration of the circumstances involved. They are the business of others, such as professional groups setting standards for professional people and church groups advising believers.

A list of what is considered good behaviour, while it might be considered desirable in itself, is not an appropriate subject for legislation. It is necessarily selective, as it cannot cover every kind of situation, and seeks to intervene in personal relationships. It is vague and general, intended to cover all situations at all times. This makes its enforceability questionable. Whilst the charter is supposedly based on the declaration mentioned above, it is much more far reaching, introducing a significant range of new responsibilities. It creates a whole page and a half of responsibilities of journalists and specification of other responsibilities for other professions that the declaration does not have. It substantially reframes many of the existing ones. Some responsibilities are already established by law. Clause 5 of the charter says, for example, that you may not rob or dispossess anyone else or any group of people. It also mentions assaulting police officers.

These offences are already provided for, in much more specific and useful detail, in the Crimes Act. I do not think we need this bill to tell people that they should refrain from robbery or theft, or, for that matter, assaulting police officers. Some responsibilities listed are at odds with legislative regimes established elsewhere. For example, clause 12, setting out responsibilities of employers and employees, ignores the industrial legislative scheme and enterprise agreements that govern the workplace. It is intriguing as to how the responsibility of employees to raise issues with their employers relating to conditions of work is to operate in practice. Is industrial action to be a civic responsibility? This is one of the examples of the fact that the charter will raise more questions than it answers.

The charter is selective. Some areas and professions are singled out and given uneven treatment and others are not. Journalists are subject to the most responsibilities, and teachers, lawyers and judges are also mentioned, with some responsibilities listed for each. Whilst it is stated that political power should not be “misused as instruments for

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