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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2004 Week 02 Hansard (Thursday, 4 March 2004) . . Page.. 741 ..

prospect of a fire or the matter in the air as a result of fire—soot and smoke creating the circumstances where power lines would arc and generate faults. My memory of the discussion that led to the issue of the declaration of the state of emergency being raised was as a consequence of a discussion around a potentiality that the Emergency Services Bureau was aware that there could be power failures in Canberra as a result of the fire front meeting the major powerline that travels through Namadgi—I do not know its exact route but it travels through Namadgi and the Brindabellas; I presume it is the transgrid line—and that there was raised this possibility.

To put the discussion in context, though, at that stage the fire had not reached, as I understand it, those powerlines. At that stage it was not a live issue; it was a theoretical possibility; a scenario was painted that there could be major issues in relation to power supply in a certain circumstance. I would imagine—I have no memory of it but I am saying that this is how I imagine the discussion may have proceeded—that somebody, either one of those making the presentation or one of the members of the cabinet said, “Well, what would happen if 80 per cent of Canberra was blacked out?” I cannot remember specifically how the conversation went but I imagine the response to that, from Mr Castles, Mr Lucas-Smith or whoever it was that made the comment about a declaration of a state of emergency—I believe it was Mr Castles—was something like, “Well, if 80 per cent of Canberra blacks out, you can imagine the turmoil that would be created. Just go for the obvious things—no traffic lights, no this and no that. Just imagine if 80 per cent of Canberra suffered a power failure; there would be enormous implications.” In the context of that, somebody said, “What would we do?” and the answer was, “Well, you would have to declare a state of emergency.” That is as I imagine the conversation went. It certainly was discussed. I do not remember who said what or who asked the questions or exactly how it was generated, but there was a conversation around a state of emergency and, to the best of my memory, it followed a conversation about the potential for arcing in powerlines in the Brindabellas.

MR SMYTH: So, therefore, Chief Minister, are you saying that there was no discussion of the threat of the impact of the fire on the urban edge and you would have us believe that the discussion of procedures for the state of declaration of emergency on Thursday, 16 January was not based on the same considerations that prompted the discussions on 18 January—the need to evacuate residents and the impact of the fire on the urban edge?

MR STANHOPE: That is my very clear memory. My clear memory is that the discussion around a state of emergency at the cabinet briefing was related to a discussion around electricity supply and was not a discussion around the potential for a state of emergency as a result of the fire front potentially impacting on the urban edge. As I have indicated previously, the cabinet was not left with any real feeling of anxiety around that as a potentiality. Each of my colleagues went to that issue yesterday, and I do not believe, in the context of the briefing that we received and the fact that there was no position put that anticipated that as an outcome at that time—namely, Thursday morning, the l6th—that the discussion around the state of emergency related at all to the circumstances in which a state of emergency would be required in the event of a real and imminent threat to residences or to the urban edge or to the suburbs, because, as I said, the briefing did not go to that as a real or anticipated possibility at that stage.

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