Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .

Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2004 Week 01 Hansard (Tuesday, 10 February 2004) . . Page.. 65 ..

Ministers do, however, have overall responsibility for the administration of their portfolios and for carriage in the Parliament of their accountability obligations resulting from that responsibility. They would be properly held to account for matters for which they were personally responsible, or where they were aware of problems but had not acted to rectify them.

In the UK it is the “principle that it is ministers who are directly accountable to parliament for both their own policies and for the actions of their departments”. Indeed, Sir Ivor Jennings in his classic work The British Constitution outlined the traditional view of ministerial responsibility. He wrote:

The responsibility of ministers to the House of Commons is no fiction, though it is not as simple as it sounds. All decisions of any consequence are taken by ministers, either as such or as members of the Cabinet. All decisions taken by civil servants are taken on behalf of ministers and under their control. If the Minister chooses, as in large departments inevitably he must, to leave decisions to civil servants, then he must take the political consequences of any defect of administration, any injustice to an individual or any policy disapproved by the House of Commons.

Government departments have grown in size to such an extent that expecting ministers to make every single decision is unreasonable, or being aware of any problems as soon as they arise is virtually impossible. Another more reasonable standard has been adopted. Ministers are expected to act as soon as they should reasonably have become aware of a problem within their department or agency.

There are three means of determining when a minister should have become aware of a problem: firstly, whether someone in his or her department provided advice either orally or in writing when a problem has arisen; secondly, if an independent watchdog such as an auditor-general or an ombudsman highlights a serious deficiency in the government administration; and, thirdly, if an Assembly committee highlights defects in policy or administration within a department or agency within a minister’s department. Should any of these events take place, the Assembly and the community have a reasonable expectation that the minister will act.

Dr Emy, in a submission to the Coombs royal commission on public administration, highlighted the importance of a parliament in maintaining standards of ministerial responsibility. I quote:

But the House itself has taken too little interest in the procedures and devices it has at its disposal for securing information and accountability. It has failed to use the reports from either independent authorities such as the Public Service Board, or from its own committees such as Public Accounts.

The submission goes on to say:

Consequently, even the concept of answerability is of little practical significance. It has even less significance if ministers themselves refuse to take this function seriously.

It is up to the Assembly to ensure that appropriate standards of ministerial responsibility are upheld. We must ensure that government ministers take Assembly reports seriously

Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .