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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2003 Week 4 Hansard (2 April) . . Page.. 1207 ..
MR STEFANIAK (continuing):
false. (Extension of time granted.) Accordingly, whilst that is an obvious thing a court would look at, to see if it is genuine, my committee-especially a couple there who were representing victims-felt that, while sometimes it is fairly obvious to everyone that a person has demonstrated remorse, and that is most relevant, often remorse is simply put on, to attract a lighter penalty. That is something a court would obviously look at. However, to have to have regard for that, even when someone is not being fair dinkum, is not desirable. Accordingly, we would suggest that that be deleted.
Section 342A adds a section in relation to guideline judgments. In section 344 there are a number of matters which cannot be taken into account-obvious things like legislation which has not come into operation, any alleged offences to which the defendant has not admitted-that is fair enough; you cannot take those into account-if the person chose not to give evidence on oath, and the fact that a person chose to plead not guilty. Those are all very desirable things for a court not to take into account.
However, concern was expressed in relation to subclauses (d) and (e). Subclause (d) is that the person may have committed perjury or been guilty of contempt of court during the course of proceedings, and (e) refers to the person's behaviour in court. For those not to be matters which can be taken into account we felt was perhaps not desirable, and we felt that it would be better if they were deleted.
Finally, Mr Speaker, section 375 (1) (b) lists a number of maximum penalties which can be dealt with by the Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court at present can deal with matters, in certain circumstances, where there is an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding (i) if the offence relates to money or other property, 14 years; or (ii) in any other case, 10 years.
As this bill increases, in about 40 instances, a number of maximum penalties, some of which do go up to 15 years, and as I feel it is very appropriate to increase the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court so it can deal with sentences punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years, I think it is sensible to lift that level in section 375 from 10 and 14 respectively to 15 years. That replicates very nicely what has been done in the first part of this bill, which is to bring us into line with New South Wales.
There is good reason why the Magistrates Court can exercise a jurisdiction in matters such as that at present, even though it is limited to two years per offence. For consistency and desirability with what I have done in respect of increasing maximum penalties, the maximum limit which will apply to the Magistrates Court should be raised to 15 years. It realistically takes into account the fact that a number of offences have been increased to that limit.
Mr Speaker, I commend this legislation to the Assembly. I remind my colleagues in the Assembly that the vast majority of our citizens want to see improvements made in sentencing, and want to see a toughening-up in sentencing. Of the 75 submissions I received late last year, when I called for submissions in relation to sentencing, some 72 were in favour of a tougher approach being taken on sentencing-not only by the courts, but also by necessary amendments to the law. Two others had a go at both Jon Stanhope and me, saying we are all full of bullshit. He asked why we don't introduce mandatory sentences.
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