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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 8 Hansard (9 August) . . Page.. 2807 ..

MR STANHOPE (continuing):

A police officer will have the right to enter premises, even where an issue in which he has an interest involves a relevant summary offence, as defined. Of course, Mr Speaker, there is plenty of scope for debate once we get to the situation of allowing the police to enter a home on the basis of a suspicion that a summary offence may have been committed.

There are a range of other issues, scenarios or examples that one could turn to in relation to this new definition of "summary offence". For instance, negligent driving, being a little bit careless turning into your driveway or perhaps refusing to signal are summary offences. They fall within the definition of relevant offence, to the extent that they can constitute the offence of negligent driving, and negligent driving is a relevant offence according to this legislation. The Legal Aid Office used this very example in putting their views on this amendment.

Let me turn to the advice on this bill that the Legal Aid Office would have given the Attorney had they been consulted. Of course, the Legal Aid Office does have a different perspective on these issues than do the AFP or the DPP. One wonders why other sources, even statutory offices or other organs of the Attorney's department, were not involved in this law-making exercise. This is what the Legal Aid Office think about this new power.

This proposal allows police, using reasonable force, to enter a person's home because they are suspected of having driven with a bald tyre. (Indeed the home may belong to someone else, e.g. a parent). (We are aware of a number of convictions for negligent driving where a bald tyre was the ground for conviction).

We think that is far too wide an ambit for the section. We wonder why it is necessary even for minor theft to be included. While it may well be argued that the present restriction is "unduly restrictive", the proposal seems one likely to empower a police officer to enter premises in the most unforeseen circumstances.

The view of the Legal Aid Office is that, potentially, under this amendment a police officer can use reasonable force-I guess that means bashing in the door-to enter a home on the basis that somebody may have driven their car with a bald tyre. It may be that the police can use reasonable force, namely bashing in the door, even when it is not that person's home-when it is, for instance, the home of their parents.

Is that reasonable? Is that appropriate? Is it appropriate that we reduce the standard, once again, in relation to what has long been regarded as a person's inherent right, namely, the inviolability of their home; that we should increase police powers to the extent that we are prepared to sanction a law which allows a police officer to bash in someone's front door in the circumstance that they may have committed a summary offence?

Everybody laughs and scoffs, and there is a constant refrain from the other side: "Well, if they have got nothing to be guilty about or if they have done nothing they don't need to worry." Of course, we know it does not work like that. If you give a power, the power is there to be used. This is the example that the Legal Aid Office used to

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