Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .

Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 5 Hansard (1 May) . . Page.. 1265 ..

MR OSBORNE (continuing):

The Assembly referred the government's Defamation Bill to the justice committee at the end of August last year. This has not been a particularly easy inquiry for the committee. Although we held three public hearings, we received few submissions and attracted very little public interest outside those who already have strong vested interests.

The committee acknowledges that the ACT is not well served by the current defamation laws and that some law reform is warranted. These laws are a problem for both the media and for potential defamation plaintiffs. As Mr Crispin Hull submitted, the current law encourages bad journalism instead of preventing it.

The law also does not favour the interests of people who feel they have been defamed. Two gentlemen, Sir Lennox Hewitt and Sir David Smith, spoke of their experience of firstly being defamed and then having to use the legal system to obtain redress for attacks on reputation. Their experiences were not only traumatic but also time consuming and expensive.

The Defamation Bill attempts to address some of the problems with the current law. The committee was tasked with considering three specific aspects of the government's bill: first, whether the ACT should return to the common law formulation of the defence of truth found in clause 16 of the bill; second, whether the ACT should adopt a defence based on negligence found in clause 23; and, third, whether under the proposed offer of amends provision, clause 6, a plaintiff should be able to claim not only recompense for expenses but also compensation for the damage done to a victim's reputation and business.

I will speak briefly about each of these proposals in turn, Mr Speaker. First, the defence of truth. Our existing law contains a defence against a defamation action by requiring a media outlet to show that the information published was both true and that it was for the public benefit to disclose that information. Originally, at common law, proving truth was the only requirement for a complete defence against a defamation action. This was altered during the 19th century to protect the reputations of former convicts, adding the requirement of proving public benefit.

An example of how this works can be seen in the case where a public figure person had a cheque dishonoured and had that fact made public by a media outlet. The person sought redress through the court and won, the magistrate ruling that although the facts published about the dishonoured cheque were indeed true there was no need for the public to know.

The committee noted that some states have since returned to the common law of truth alone as a defence, New South Wales and Queensland being notable exceptions. The Australian Press Council rather boldly stated that "people should be prepared to live with true statements about them". I will leave whoever reads this report to ponder that statement for themselves.

Conversely, the committee was made aware of a New South Wales Supreme Court ruling stating that the private behaviour of a public figure could only become a matter of public interest in one of two ways: (1) because it had some bearing upon their capacity to perform their public duties, or (2) because they made it a matter of public interest by their own conduct. The committee also noted that the ACT currently has no privacy

Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .