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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 2 Hansard (27 February) . . Page.. 300 ..

MR STANHOPE (continuing):

I think it is interesting that, in response to me, the government reverted to claims about high-profile trials-in particular trials going back to 1993-to justify this particular piece of legislation. It really highlights the paucity of justification for this particular piece of legislation at this particular time.

I think it is fair to note that some years ago New South Wales managed the trial involving the two rival bikie gangs involved in the Milperra shoot-out without the need for special security legislation. Of course, there is a risk that people attending the courts will be violent. Many of them are charged with crimes of violence. Others are under great stress caused by the fact that they must give evidence against those charged with violence. Yet others are under great stress because the breakdown of their relationships and marriages have led them to seek the court's assistance. Neighbourhood feuds that have flared in violence come before the courts.

We accept and acknowledge that at times there are, within the environs of courts, within court buildings and within courts, people that have exhibited a tendency to violence, people that are violent and people that are in a highly charged emotional state. And, of course, the judiciary and their staff need to be protected from this potentially violent mix. But the question that has to be asked, and the question we are asking, is: is this bill the appropriate way to do it?

It was suggested that rather simpler amendments to the Supreme Court Act and the Magistrates Court Act could have empowered the Chief Judicial Officers of those courts to take reasonable steps to make their premises secure. This would ensure that, whatever action was taken, the security officers would be directly answerable to the chief judicial officers. Alternatively, or even in addition, the government could have ensured a role for the police in removing people from the court, and exempted lawyers, at least, from the bill's provisions. And there is another issue there that I will not labour in detail, but, for instance, the provisions of this particular bill apply to all legal representatives representing clients.

On what basis can you justify a provision that makes the legal representative of a person, albeit perhaps a violent person, appearing in a court in the ACT susceptible to a requirement that he provide to a security officer, his name, his address and the reason that he is in court; and, if he does not comply with those requests, that he be excluded from the court? You might say that it is a circumstance that would never arise; it is a trifle, an example that really does not warrant consideration or contemplation. But I insist that it does.

These are fundamental principles about the operations of our courts and our system of justice. We are potentially raising the scenario where a security officer, albeit in this extreme circumstance, has the power to exclude from the court a legal practitioner who, for whatever reason, simply refuses to explain his presence in court.

It is the chipping away of fundamental principles that is a danger. These are fundamental principles in relation to the operation of a whole range of our institutions, but in particular in relation to the operation of courts in the delivery of justice, and this should not be undertaken without some very serious consideration.

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