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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 1 Hansard (14 February) . . Page.. 99 ..

MR OSBORNE (continuing):

General, so there is no reason to believe that will change. Instead, I envisage a discreet consideration of the merits of a candidate to do an excellent job in running a department, whoever was in government.

Gaining committee approval would not mean that the committee was to blame should a successful nomination ever make a mistake or perform poorly. The committee is helping to select a person to do the job, not sign off on every decision that that person would then go on to make. The public accounts committee already has a say in the employment of the Auditor-General and, I am sure, does not hold its breath every time the Auditor opens his mouth. The public accounts committee comprises a member each from the government, the opposition and the crossbench-a good balance of people that, in my time as a member, has worked well together and is capable of making sensible and balanced decisions.

Just as the commissioner, the minister and an Assembly committee must all agree on an appointment of a chief executive, all three must agree on such a person's removal from office, which is possible under very strict and defined terms. Although chief executives would be given a specified period of employment for a position, say up to five years, they would be given a permanent position in the ACT public service. Their terms and conditions of employment would be fixed by the Remuneration Tribunal.

Once employed, the commissioner would continue to play a role in their career. The agreement of the commissioner would be required before the chief executive was ever appointed, transferred, redeployed or declared unattached. This is both to provide continuity and to protect the official from losing their job altogether because of ministerial disfavour. The bill is flexible, however, in providing a mechanism to ensure that a minister has a chief executive that they can work with. Chief executives currently under contract would be able to fulfil the terms of their contract; however, once off contract they would be reappointed only with the joint approval of the commissioner, the minister and the Assembly committee.

One of the functions of each chief executive would be, in consultation with the commissioner, to employ executives who together would comprise a senior executive service. In this role, the chief executive would be required to work independently of government. Appointments would be merit based and required to measure up against specified legislated capabilities.

As with chief executives, executives would be given a specified period of employment for a position, and they would be given a permanent position in the ACT public service. Terms and conditions of employment, once again, would be fixed by the Remuneration Tribunal. Also as with chief executives, the agreement of the commissioner would be required should the minister seek to re-appoint, transfer, redeploy, or declare an executive to be unattached. Executives currently under contract would also be able to fulfil the terms of their contract; however, once off contract they could be re-appointed only with the joint approval of the chief executive and the commissioner.

The third main initiative relates to training for executives. The commissioner, in consultation with the chief executives, would be charged to develop the senior executive service so that executives, and potential executives, are appropriately trained to achieve the highest standards of efficiency and management in the service. Chief executives must

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