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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 1 Hansard (15 February) . . Page.. 285 ..
MR STANHOPE (continuing):
I will tell you what the practical difference is, Attorney, and there is a practical difference. Sections 23 and 34 apply exclusively to serious offences and section 29 applies to any offences. That is the practical difference. I would like to know why, Attorney. If that is not what the practical difference is, tell me what it is. There must be a difference. You know the golden rules of interpretation, Mr Stefaniak. I was there with you when we both studied them. I remember them all.
Mr Stefaniak: So you should. You had a bit of trouble with robbery, old son.
MR STANHOPE: You are wrong on that too, Attorney. Perhaps that's the point. You were wrong on robbery and armed robbery, and you are wrong on this. The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation, and I quote from Mr Craig Everson, senior counsel and experienced criminal barrister, is that plain words must be given their plain meaning.
It is significant that the word "serious" does not appear between "another" and "offence" in section 29. There is a ready contrast with sections 23 and 34 which both use the expression "another serious offence". Section 29 uses the expression "another offence". Sections 23 and 34 use the expression "another serious offence". The sections are different, and you know as well as I know, Attorney, that when you have two sections and one of them says "another offence" and the next section says "another serious offence", there is a marked difference in the meaning of the sections. Everybody knows that, Attorney. That is why I cannot believe the position you are taking.
I cannot believe that you would demean yourself in this way. I can only assume that your purpose is to protect the dignity of the Chief Minister who simply refused to accept this when he debated the bill last year. As Mr Craig Everson says, the words "another offence" mean just that. Mr Attorney, tell us the difference between the plain meaning of "another serious offence" and the plain meaning of the words "another offence". "Another serious offence" means that; it means another serious offence. A serious offence is defined; it is an indictable offence.
Section 29 says "another offence"; not "another serious offence", just "another offence". What does Mr Craig Everson say about that? The words "another offence" mean just that-any other offence. As Mr Everson says, and as every lawyer in this room knows, and I think, Attorney, as every other person in this room knows, there is no basis for reading the word "serious" where it does not appear. You cannot just conjure it up and say, "Oh, I think they meant to bung the word 'serious' in there; let's assume they did.:
Mr Everson actually heads this advice with a couple of quotes, Mr Attorney, and you should look at and actually reflect on these quotes. This is one of them:
However ridiculous and unjust the results of the ... Act may be, and this one produces peculiarly ridiculous and unjust results, it has been enacted by Parliament and it is our duty to enforce it.
That is what you have done, Attorney. The other quote says:
If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislation has committed an absurdity.
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