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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2000 Week 5 Hansard (9 May) . . Page.. 1258 ..

MR STANHOPE (continuing):

Attorney raises that we are suggesting that we cannot trust our judges or our magistrates, or perhaps the staff at the psychiatric unit. That is not the point. It is not the point to say, "I put my liberty for the rest of my life in the hands of somebody else and I do not ever need the opportunity to stand up in front of them and plead a case as to why I should be released, as to why perhaps my mental condition is not as others say or assume or have diagnosed it to be."

We all have a right, surely, to say, "Somebody else will not make that decision for me. I will make the decision as to whether I want to appear in person, whether I want to stand up and look in the eye those people who will say to me, 'No, we want you locked up for another few years; you are obviously not a fit person to be granted your liberty.' " That is a fundamental principle. The Attorney should not deny that as a fundamental principle-the fundamental principle to protect one's liberty.

MR HUMPHRIES (Treasurer, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Community Safety) (11.42): Mr Speaker, on the question of the Mental Health Tribunal's taking of evidence from the hospital, there is not an audiovisual link between the hospital and the court because the rarity of the taking of evidence in that form would not justify the expense of putting in place a link between the two places. I might point out, however, Mr Speaker, that there are other places where a mentally ill person may give evidence remotely from a court. For example, I have to say with some regret that there are mentally ill people who from time to time pass through the Remand Centre. Such people may conceivably give evidence from the Remand Centre remotely, if that rare circumstance ever arose. They may also give evidence from places outside the ACT altogether, as is possible under the legislation.

We come back to the reality that the discretion is necessary, albeit very rarely exercised, is in accordance with the decision the Assembly has already made, is in accordance with the legislation in force in every other part of Australia and is in accordance with the qualifications which already exist on what Mr Stanhope describes as a fundamental right of appearance in Australian courts. Those qualifications are quite clear.

I note, in finishing my remarks, the comments of Mr Stanhope about having enormous respect and admiration for the Mental Health Tribunal. I note that it was the same chair of the tribunal, Mr Cahill, whose Children's Court Mr Stanhope last year inadvertently abolished at one point in the course of debate because of a lack of care in the legislation he was bringing forward. Mr Cahill's views about there not being a necessity to have a specialist children's magistrate were fairly contumeliously overridden. Mr Speaker, I think Mr Stanhope's protestations about the admiration he has for the head of the court is a little bit hard to accept.

MR STANHOPE (Leader of the Opposition): I seek leave to speak, under standing order 46.

Leave granted.

MR STANHOPE: It is a pity that Mr Osborne is not here. I do not know whether I need leave under standing order 46 to explain the mistakes the Attorney just made.

Mr Humphries: At the end of the debate is the usual place for that to occur.

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