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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2000 Week 5 Hansard (9 May) . . Page.. 1255 ..

MR HUMPHRIES: I do not know why Mr Stanhope is getting personal about this, Mr Speaker. I am simply putting to the Assembly what has already been considered and agreed to by the Assembly with respect to protection of the operation of the courts of the ACT. If Mr Stanhope had bothered to consult with the courts about these matters, he would no doubt have had a very clear indication that they consider that the provisions we have put forward in the government's amendments are appropriate and should be retained.

If Mr Stanhope thinks that the learned judges and magistrates who populate our court benches have so little regard for the rights of individuals that they would be likely to trammel on those rights of individuals by use of this discretion, I think he has a lower opinion of them than I do. Mr Speaker, I think you can say lots of things about judges and magistrates, but their sensitivity to the needs of individuals and their circumstances is pretty clear. I have not been aware of any case where a person has been unfairly excluded from a right of appearance in a court in this territory-not one case.

We so often see this opposition put forward amendments in theoretical situations when, unfortunately, there is no practical or concrete example of why a particular right or a particular issue needs to be protected or a particular practice needs to be guarded against by having it dealt with in the legislation of the territory.

I consider that the case for a discretion is very clear. It is very obvious. It exists in ACT legislation and, as far as I am aware, it exists in legislation in all other jurisdictions as well. Mr Stanhope needs to make a compelling case for why we should depart from our existing law and the law of other jurisdictions in these matters and remove from the court a discretion to protect its proceedings in a way which is appropriate, given the challenges courts sometimes face from individuals who are intent on disrupting the work of the courts.

I note on a slightly analogous matter that members in this place, to which they are elected by force of the vote of the electorate of the ACT, have no unqualified right to appear in this place. Members can be and, as Mr Berry knows, are from time to time excluded from this place. Their right of appearance in the democratic chamber is qualified. If it is qualified here, why should it not be qualified in a court of law? Mr Speaker, I would suggest to members that the amendments that Mr Stanhope is putting forward should be rejected.

MR STANHOPE (Leader of the Opposition) (11.32): I think the arguments advanced by the Attorney are so shallow and so spurious as almost not to deserve response. I clearly indicated that there was a range of exceptions to a general and fundamental principle to appear in person in open court. It is a fundamental principle. I read into Hansard from my notes article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which sets out the range of exceptions that are acceptable under that convention. I did not go the extra step of giving some detail of the circumstances in which a court could refuse to allow a person to sit in person in that court.

The Attorney brought up the Eastman case. If there is a person who is being generally disruptive, threatening violence and doing all sorts of other things, then of course it is reasonable that he not be allowed to sit in the body of the court. We all know there are cases where courts will exercise that discretion. These amendments provide a blanket

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