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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 1999 Week 12 Hansard (24 November) . . Page.. 3631 ..

MR SPEAKER: I warn you, Mr Hargreaves.

MS CARNELL: Mr Speaker, as we have said before today, the approach of acting when we find out what is wrong is exactly the approach that we took when coronial reports came down in this place into other deaths, other sad, tragic incidents, that have occurred since self-government. What I would like to do today, though, is to focus on what we are doing about the problems, most of which flowed from arrangements put in place by those opposite when they were last in office.

Mr Speaker, the basis of Mr Stanhope's claims is that there were within the ACT Government failures identified by the coroner for which I should be entirely responsible and therefore should resign or be sacked. He did not say that I should be responsible for fixing them. He said that I should be sacked for them.

Most members will be familiar with the background to the whole issue. The genesis of the project was an agreement in April 1995, very soon after we came to government, with the Commonwealth to make the hospital site available for the construction of the National Museum of Australia. The choice of a site for the museum was a decision of the Federal Labor Government of Paul Keating. The basis of the agreement was the removal of the hospital by the ACT prior to the handover. The Territory then moved to discharge its obligation to demolish the hospital. It set in motion the normal Public Service processes by appointing a project manager and other experts to run the project.

Following agreement with the Commonwealth, the Department of Urban Services engaged a consultant, Richard Glenn and Associates, to undertake a feasibility study on the clearing of the site. Members who have been in this Assembly for a while will remember that Richard Glenn and Associates did most of the work on Royal Canberra Hospital and the refurbishment of Woden Valley Hospital, so that they came to us with - and, I have to say, still have - a very good reputation in these sorts of areas.

Mr Speaker, implosion was first mentioned in that consultant's report in July 1995. As the coroner stated on page 100 of his report, "nobody has suggested the use of implosion to him" - meaning to Richard Glenn - "let alone at this stage insisted upon its use". What he is saying there is that nobody said to Richard Glenn and Associates, "We want an implosion". The coroner said that that is not what happened. It was recommended or it was put forward by Richard Glenn and Associates as an option at that stage. In other words, Mr Speaker, the first suggestion about implosion came from an engineer accepted by the coroner as an expert - also, I would have to say, an engineer that this Assembly has accepted as an expert with regard to the Woden Valley Hospital refurbishment and other things that Richard Glenn has been part of.

Cabinet adopted demolition by implosion in August 1995. The coroner does note, however, that Cabinet was not provided with important information, such as the need for an overseas expert to be involved. The coroner said that Cabinet was not provided with some of the information that we should have had to make that decision. Mr Speaker, the reason that this is important is the date. We are talking about August 1995. The changes to the Public Service did not happen until after the Bill was passed in

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