Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .
Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 1999 Week 12 Hansard (24 November) . . Page.. 3595 ..
MS TUCKER (continuing):
The Chief Minister, as the ultimate head of the Government and of the Public Service, must take responsibility for these failures. This is particularly so given that the coroner believed that it was totally appropriate for the Chief Minister to have a significant role in the Acton Peninsula project because of its genesis in the land swap agreement between the Commonwealth and territory governments. The Chief Minister failed in her duty to the people of the ACT to ensure that her Public Service was up to the task of administering a project of this nature.
The specific administrative failures that I believe are relevant to this debate are, firstly, the failure to follow up the recommendations of the 1995 Richard Glenn and Associates report into the feasibility of demolishing the Acton buildings, which raised a number of concerns with the implosion method that needed further investigation. These were never picked up in the management of the project. Secondly, the selection of the Project Coordination company as the project manager without going to tender, despite them having no experience in implosion demolition. As is common with this Government, it seemed like expedience prevailed over proper process.
Thirdly, there was the appalling and sham handling of the tender selection process for the demolition contractors. The coroner makes the point that, if proper efforts had been made to check that Mr McCracken and Mr Fenwick were qualified, they never would have been given the job. These poor work practices in the appointment process permitted two persons to be assigned to the demolition project who were entirely unqualified for the task. Fourthly, there was the fact that no approval was ever given for the demolition by the ACT Building Controller or the National Capital Authority because of confusion over which government controlled the site.
Fifthly, there was the failure of WorkCover officers to exercise their statutory functions in relation to the site. The coroner notes that there were at least two and probably three if not more occasions when the WorkCover inspectors, having entertained doubts about the project continuing, should have issued prohibition notices requiring the work to cease until certain aspects of that work were rectified. The reason for this, whether it was because of officer incompetence, the poor management of WorkCover or because of implicit or explicit pressure to keep the implosion on schedule, needs to be further examined.
I noticed that Mr Smyth, in his speech, selectively quoted from the coroner's report on WorkCover. I will add a little bit to what he quoted. Basically, the coroner says:
This segment of the Report is critical of particularly ACT WorkCover and to a lesser extent the Dangerous Goods Unit. Yet there is no escape from the fact that the primary responsibility for the safety of the Acton demolition rested with the demolition contractors, those supervising them and those who employed them. Whatever the
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .