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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 1999 Week 9 Hansard (1 September) . . Page.. 2732 ..

MR HUMPHRIES (continuing):

There has been a move away from the classic Westminster type of very powerful government to a government which has traditionally been a minority government in the ACT and which has therefore had some of its traditional prerogatives ceded to or shared with the legislature. For example, whereas the parliament traditionally in other Westminster systems has no role in the making of statutory appointments, in the ACT the parliament has a very distinct role and it has the right to be able to decide whether to question a particular appointment because it is referred by statute to a committee of the parliament.

Mr Speaker, the question here is whether the further step should be taken of having the legislature if not demand then at least strongly suggest to the Executive that it should rearrange the administrative arrangements it has seen fit to put in place; that the legislature say to the Chief Minister of the day, who has the power to appoint under the Self-Government Act, "You should not exercise your power in the way that you have seen fit; you should exercise the power in the way in which the parliament believes you should exercise it". That is perhaps not a large step in itself, Mr Speaker, but I am convinced that if it was taken by the parliament it would result in further change down the line, and that change would be essentially unhelpful. That change would be to give the parliament a power which I do not think you can have in a system with a concept of separation of powers in existence.

The idea of separation of powers is misunderstood in the Westminster system. It occurs in a more realistic sense in the Washington model where there is a very clear distinction between the legislature and the Executive. In the Australian system or the Westminster system, the Executive is part of the legislature, almost invariably, but there have been certain prerogatives left to the Executive in that situation, and one of the most fundamental, I would argue, is the power to appoint members of the government benches to the Executive. Barring some act of impropriety or disqualification to make that decision as the mechanisms of government see fit, whether it is by election among members of the government benches or by dint of the grace and favour of the Chief Minister of the day or head of the government of the day, whatever it might be, that decision has traditionally been preserved to the head of the government, and I would argue it should continue to be.

If the Assembly were to make requirements or demands or calls on the Government of the kind that this motion embodies on a regular basis, I believe that it would be only a matter of time before the Executive would be forced by the legislature to construct its ministry in a particular way. I think that would be very unfortunate. Perhaps others in this place do not feel that that is the case. Perhaps they feel that the Executive should be partly constructed on the will of the Assembly. I have to say, on the basis of the present model, that I do not think that is appropriate. I think we should resist that.

I also suspect, Mr Speaker, that if we were to have this debate at a time when the Labor Party was in government their position would be very different from what it has been today. They would argue against any change, no doubt based on its merits, but they would also argue strongly that it is the Executive's right to make those decisions. Why would they say that? Because historically, Mr Speaker, the Labor Party has been in favour of stronger central government. It has opposed systems which put in place what it

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