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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 1998 Week 10 Hansard (25 November) . . Page.. 2913 ..

MR HUMPHRIES (continuing):

and I will return to them in a little while. If we look at the substance of this legislation, not the mere words of its detractors but the substance, the general objectives, I think, would be very hard to argue with.

The Bill first of all is focused on the concept of full disclosure to a person undertaking an abortion. In other fields, Mr Speaker, a person undergoing treatment or surgery is expected to receive full disclosure about the complications and potential risks involved in that particular operation or procedure. Indeed, the liability of doctors who conduct such procedures or operations without that full disclosure increases. When you consider any other sort of medical or surgical procedure that a person might undertake, the common law requires that you be advised of all reasonably foreseeable risks and consequences, or the consent which you give in the absence of such full information could be nullified and a battery on your person could be committed.

The question I pose today is this: What is wrong with applying those same principles to disclosure before abortion? What is wrong with applying those very same common-law principles to women who might undertake to obtain an abortion? Some might say, "Well, what is wrong with letting the common law apply in this area and let it apply to the duty of doctors?". The problem, of course, is that the common law in this area is not particularly helpful. The common-law status of abortion is, to say the least, somewhat unclear. Reference has been made to various common-law decisions which have laid out what the position of those undertaking abortion might be. It is, at least on the face of it, different from what appears on the face of the Crimes Act, particularly sections 40 to 45. So, Mr Speaker, reliance on the common law is not an easy option in this particular case and therefore it is appropriate to set out clearly what it is that the duty on doctors in these circumstances should be. I do not see any reason whatsoever, and I have heard no reason in this debate so far, why those principles of disclosure should not apply in this case - none whatsoever.

Mr Speaker, the second issue is the issue of the cooling-off period, the second main plank of this legislation. As others have said in this debate, before you complete the purchase of a vacuum cleaner from a door-to-door salesman, before you purchase a second-hand car, you are required to experience the effect of a cooling-off period. That is imposed by the law of the Territory. How much more important is a decision on having an abortion than either of those things? If we should wait 10 days before confirming a sale from a door-to-door salesman, why should we not wait 72 hours before confirming the decision, as some would have it, to end another human life within a woman's womb? How much more serious are the consequences of making the wrong decision in the case of having an abortion?

I have not heard anyone in this debate contend that sometimes the decision to have an abortion can be the wrong decision for the woman concerned. I am told that a delay of 72 hours between inquiry or seeking information and the carrying out of an abortion is not unusual - indeed, it is even customary - in the case of abortions in the ACT. If a cooling-off period is imposed by law, are we really imposing anything so terribly shocking on the way in which the legislation might operate?

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