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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 1998 Week 10 Hansard (25 November) . . Page.. 2892 ..
MR CORBELL (continuing):
is another of the most patronising parts of this Bill. It suggests that women have not already considered uniformly the consequences of their actions. It suggests that they are incapable of making an informed choice and suggests that they have got it wrong. That is not a proposition that I am prepared to accept.
Mr Temporary Deputy Speaker, in preparing for this debate, my attention was drawn to some advice prepared by a lawyer on the issue of consent and information, which is central to the arguments of those who choose to support this Bill. My attention was drawn to a High Court case in 1992 - Rogers v. Whitaker. In its ruling the High Court stated that a doctor must inform their patient of all material risks associated with a medical procedure. I will quote from this document very briefly:
The High Court said a risk will be material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, either: a reasonable person in the patient's position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it; or if the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that this particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.
Mr Temporary Deputy Speaker, what this means is that there was already a requirement to provide to a woman who is seeking an abortion all the information she needs to make an informed decision. That is already a requirement under law as found in this High Court ruling. So, why are we attempting to impose a narrow and strict definition of what sort of information should be made available? Why are we seeking to do that when there is already an obligation upon a medical practitioner to ensure that information is provided. Clause 8 of the Bill is the clause which requires information to be provided. I would argue that in many respects clause 8 is superfluous because of this ruling.
I am drawn again to some comments in this advice which highlight just how absurd this proposal is. This is to do with the requirement that the provision of standardised information about foetal development to the woman seeking an abortion is provided regardless of whether the content of that information and the way in which it is presented are suited to her particular needs, concerns and circumstances. Again, it is us trying to impose between the woman and her doctor how that relationship should be managed without any knowledge of the individual circumstances, needs or concerns of that particular woman. How can we do that? How can we dare suggest we do that? That is exactly what this Bill does.
Doctors are already under a legal obligation to provide information in an appropriate manner. Rogers v. Whitaker does this. If there is some problem with the way doctors provide information, then it should not be restricted just to abortion. If the argument of those on the other side of this place is that there is some problem with the way doctors communicate information to their patients, why are we confining this just to the abortion debate? Why are we not going the whole hog? Why are we not doing it with every aspect of the doctor-patient relationship and the provision of information between doctors and their patients on a whole range of medical procedures? Why are we confining it to abortion? We are confining it to abortion to suit the moral and religious views of a minority and imposing it on the doctor-patient relationship when it comes to women seeking a termination. Again, Mr Temporary Deputy Speaker, it is the sort of approach that I cannot condone or support in any way.
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