Page 4277 - Week 14 - Tuesday, 29 November 1994

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Again, this is similar to provisions in legislation which say that a person is entitled to receive reasons for decisions - not that they should; not that they should receive advice; not that they must receive advice; not that they shall receive advice; but that they shall receive reasons. Again, it would not be hard to couch that in simple language. This is an issue that we must return to at some point in the future.

I have a few other concerns about the Bill. I am concerned about the width of the definition of "victim". In clause 3 "victim" is defined, in terms of a secondary victim, as:

any person who was financially or psychologically dependent on the primary victim immediately before his or her death;

Those people are, of course, very much secondary victims; but it seems to me that it is possible to be very close to a person and to be deeply hurt and grieved by a person's death but not necessarily to be psychologically dependent on that person. One's child might be killed by a criminal act. It might be hard to describe yourself as being psychologically dependent on your child, but you are still very much a victim of that criminal act. Perhaps we need to look at that question again.

Madam Speaker, I have a concern about subclause 9(2) of the Bill, which requires people who perform a function in the administration of justice - that would clearly include lawyers, I think, who are officers of the court - to assist the victims of crime coordinator as far as practicable, in relation to the giving of information requested by the coordinator for the purposes of an investigation. It occurred to me that this might entail some power to override legal professional privilege, and I trust that the Attorney-General will have something to say about that interpretation. Those are my concerns. They are not serious enough to move amendments, but they are certainly matters which need to be returned to at some point.

Let me comment briefly on the Acts Revision (Victims of Crime) Bill. Its purpose is, in the case of the Bail Act and in the case of the Parole Act, to give victims an opportunity to know in advance what decision has been made by, in the case of the Bail Act, the court in granting bail to an accused; and, in the case of the Parole Act, the Parole Board in deciding to grant parole to a particular inmate. There is also provision for victim impact statements to be used in courts where the offence charged is one that carries a maximum of five years' imprisonment or more. Those are good provisions. I support them. I had a concern about those provisions whereby victims are to be advised about the outcome of those decisions. I also had a concern about the process whereby the victims' interests were to be conveyed to those bodies and, in turn, the bodies were to convey their decision to the victims. I know that it is not usual for courts to communicate directly with witnesses. Certainly, if witnesses are represented, that is the role of legal counsel. It is unusual to have officers of the court getting in touch directly with witnesses. It might occasionally give rise to problems. I wonder what consequence the victim impact statements will have on the resourcing of the courts. I wonder who will actually take on the task of ensuring that those statements are prepared and available to the people who want to make a statement. They are often in a distressed state. How will those people have both the advice and the physical means to make that kind of statement?


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