Page 3522 - Week 12 - Wednesday, 12 October 1994
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MR MOORE (12.13): Mr Kaine raises the question of sanity; but I think it is far better that, rather than dealing with that, we deal with the issue. He raises some very important questions. Madam Speaker, whereas I accused him of filibustering earlier, I accept that with this clause it is appropriate to have a detailed debate. The first question that Mr Kaine raises is why we would put in "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law of the Territory". Let me refer Mr Kaine to the House of Lords decision that Mr Connolly quoted. The decision in the Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, the Bland decision, may well have come down the other way. If that had been the case, then we would be talking about a change to our laws that comes into effect through the common law. Although it did not happen in that particular case, in another case we could see a reversal.
First of all, this law needs to be clarified in terms of the common law. Secondly, I think it is also important to look at section 18 of the Crimes Act in terms of the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law of the Territory" and also in terms of the words in Mr Stevenson's amendment, "other than the laws relating to homicide and suicide", because section 18 refers to suicide. In fact, the title of it is "Prevention of suicide". Section 18 says:
It is lawful for a person to use such force as is reasonable to prevent the suicide of another person or an act which the person believes on reasonable grounds would, if committed, result in the suicide of another person.
Somebody could conceivably say, "If I believed that somebody was going to use adequate pain relief in order to assist somebody to commit suicide, I could use whatever force I could possibly find in order to stop that". Certainly, members of the United States Right to Life movement find it appropriate to use homicide. Therefore, one could conceive of a case in which on personal moral grounds a person could indeed feel that this was an appropriate action to take. For that reason alone, it is important that we ensure that there is appropriate legislation that does not have the exclusions that Mr Stevenson puts up. They are not necessary. In fact, it was Mr Kaine who, in giving his example of the young person, said, "It would not be reasonable". Yes, Mr Kaine, that is exactly why it is that Mr Connolly put up, and I accepted, the amendment adding the words "on reasonable grounds". The example you gave would not be reasonable, and that is adequately taken care of by Mr Connolly's amendment. What we have here, Madam Speaker, is an amendment that adds nothing. It causes some further difficulties and should be rejected by this house.
I understand Mr Kaine's concerns about active euthanasia. This Bill is not about active euthanasia. This Bill is about ensuring that people have adequate pain relief. Our committee heard again and again that there were people who were not getting adequate pain relief. We determined that it was appropriate that we address that situation and that the pain relief should not be just a decision of a doctor who says, "Usually this amount of morphine would provide this person with pain relief; therefore, I think they have enough pain relief". We know that that has been inadequate. The medical profession is moving generally in that direction, so it is appropriate that we provide adequate pain relief.
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