Page 2563 - Week 09 - Wednesday, 24 August 1994

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The threshold of 5 per cent of electors required to support a popular request before it can go to the Assembly in the form of a proposed law means that it would have to be supported by 9,500 people, as I said before, at current population levels. This would be quite difficult to achieve and is right at the top of the range in the light of international experience. Indeed, Professor Geoffrey Walker has noted that threshold levels of more than 5 per cent mean that the community consultation process may not be used. A Bill with higher levels could be dismissed as merely providing the illusion of democracy.

The argument runs that if the threshold is too low - 2 per cent seems to be cited as too low - it will encourage frivolous or crackpot proposals. However, that would not occur under this legislation because of all the conditions a proposal has to meet before it can be accepted by the Electoral Commissioner for registration. At the other end of the scale, a very high threshold, such as 10 per cent or even higher, is sometimes cited as necessary to rule out frivolous or extreme proposals and, at the same time, discourage frequent attempts to initiate referenda.

Again, this barrier to the process is not necessary because of the acceptance tests applied by the Electoral Commissioner. Indeed, behind most claims for high thresholds there is a hidden agenda which is actually designed to stymie voter-initiated referenda altogether. In any case, the debate about thresholds does rather miss the point, because it focuses on only the number of supporters to trigger a referendum. The real test, and the only one that really matters, is the result of the referendum itself.

The case for a high threshold is even less relevant for this legislation because of the high level of support needed for a proposed law. In most other jurisdictions a referendum is passed if it is supported by the majority of those who decide to vote at a voluntary poll. By contrast, this Bill requires support of the majority under compulsory voting. That is, leaving aside informal votes, more than 50 per cent of eligible voters have to be in favour. That obligation totally eclipses the argument for a high threshold.

Another check built into the system is that, once a proposed law has been tabled in the Assembly, the Auditor-General does an estimate of what it is likely to cost or save. The reason for having this provision is that if a proposal is to be enshrined in law it is necessary for the community to have reliable information on how much the proposal would cost to implement or the savings that might be made, just as the Executive does when deciding on legislative proposals in this place. It is appropriate for the estimate of costs or savings to be done at the time the proposed law has been prepared, because it is the legislation, not the proposal, that governs what is and what is not to be done. If the Executive needs this financial information, then so do the people. The Auditor-General is appropriate for this task because of his knowledge of the processes of costing public expenditure, his objectivity in conducting the analysis and his credibility with the public.


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