Page 2322 - Week 08 - Wednesday, 22 June 1994
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MR HUMPHRIES: Madam Speaker, the submission that I received from him did not quite indicate that. The submission that I received from Mr Crispin, which I think was sent to all members of the Assembly - a supplementary submission, I gather, to the public service committee that Mr Kaine chaired, and now chairs again - made it clear that his preferred position was to be outside the public service structure altogether, and not be subject to any of the controls which even an autonomous instrumentality was subject to. He indicated in the submission that he would accept, as a compromise, as a very much second-best option - the idea of being an autonomous instrumentality within the structure of this Bill. For example, I will read from his conclusion:
The best and safest course would be to take literally the apparent intention of the Assembly of including in the original Director of Public Prosecutions Act the provision that the Director "shall control the Office". This should be given real effect by excluding the staff from the Public Sector Management Act and placing administrative and personnel decisions under the Director's authority.
Madam Speaker, that is the proposal that he put forward. I accept that he is relieved to find himself in a position of not being entirely within the public service, but I think the position outlined in Mrs Carnell's proposed amendment is infinitely preferable.
The problem with the present position is that it still leaves the director subject to ministerial direction. We have all observed debate in other places about the interaction between that Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the political masters of administrations around the country. We know from bitter experience that there is great potential for conflicts of interest to arise where a Director of Public Prosecutions is beginning action either against a Minister or a government. These have happened. I think that at present at least two former Premiers of Western Australia are subject to prosecution. We saw the prosecution of a former Premier of Queensland. There has been conflict between the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Victorian Government. So there are plenty of precedents for us to look to, to realise that we have a real problem potentially in this area.
It is clear that you remove the problem by addressing the question of the level of direction and control that the administration has over the Director of Public Prosecutions. It might not necessarily apply just in a case where a Minister is being sued. It may apply where a member of his or her government is being sued. It may apply where a member of his party is being sued, or where a member of his administration is being sued or prosecuted. In each of those cases there is both the potential and the perceived potential for a conflict of interest to arise, and it is important, I believe, that the Assembly prevent that from being a possibility under the framework of this Bill. We do so by making him outside the structure of the public service altogether.
I understand that the staff of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions are happy with that position. The DPP has indicated that his staff have no problem with being in that position. I believe, Madam Speaker, that we would be best serving our community by preserving a situation where there cannot be that conflict. I emphasise that it is not just a question of whether that conflict actually arises, but whether it could be perceived to have arisen. Consider the situation where a prosecution has been launched against
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