Page 4420 - Week 14 - Wednesday, 8 December 1993
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I turn to the procedures in other jurisdictions. Mr Connolly was very keen to make us look at what happens in other jurisdictions last night in a debate on another Bill, and I would remind him that the position in every other jurisdiction is that at least two people examine questions relating to findings of fact for the purpose of striking a person off the roll. As I understand the information supplied to me, in New South Wales the body which deals with cancellation or suspension of practising certificates consists of two solicitors and one lay person. In Victoria it is the secretary of the Law Institute and an ex-judge or a solicitor or a layman. In Queensland there are five to seven practitioners sitting on the appropriate board. In Western Australia there is a chairman, two practitioners and one lay person. There are three legal practitioners in South Australia, five members of a disciplinary committee in Tasmania, and in the Northern Territory any four of three practitioners nominated by the Law Society and two practitioners nominated by the Attorney-General plus one lay person.
The extent of the range of opinions which are being sought in matters where we are examining questions of fact in other jurisdictions is quite broad. It would be a little bit unfortunate if practitioners in the ACT appeared to have less protection in these sorts of matters than their colleagues in any other State or Territory. I concede that the one person hearing matters of fact in these circumstances is a judge. I do not question the capacity of judges to hear matters of fact impartially and well, but I do say that it would be appropriate for a procedure which is quasi criminal in nature to be dealt with in a quasi criminal way.
Madam Speaker, those are the arguments. I will not press them because, obviously, they are not the view of the Assembly at this stage; but I do look forward to coming back and examining this matter, perhaps next year, in connection with an amendment to deal with the creation of a tribunal in the ACT. I might just note before sitting down that not many cases of this kind come before the courts. I am advised that in the last three or four years there have been only four disciplinary matters. They took on average two days each, of which approximately one day was taken up with findings of fact. What that means is that the amendment I am proposing would cost, in that sense, on average, only two judge days per year. That is not exactly a heavy toll on our courts and it does result, I think, in a greater degree of fairness. Those are the arguments, Madam Speaker, and I look forward to coming back and visiting them again, perhaps next year.
MR MOORE (4.44): Madam Speaker, I am delighted that the Attorney-General has agreed to revisit this issue and to have a look at the possibility of a tribunal. I think that is a far better way to deal with the issue. I must say that when Mr Humphries approached me on this issue last week - the Law Society did the same - it seemed to me that the logical way to go until such time as a tribunal is established is to provide as much fairness and as broad a safety net as possible for members of the legal profession who find themselves in this position. For that reason I will be supporting the amendment moved by Mr Humphries. I recognise that with the establishment of a tribunal such a system will not be necessary. I would hope, in fact, that it will never be used. As Mr Humphries pointed out, and as the Law Society pointed out to me as well, there have been three or four cases - approximately one a year - in the ACT where matters of this nature have been dealt with. Nevertheless, I think that, for another year, the fairest possible system ought to be there. For those reasons I will be supporting this amendment.
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