Page 451 - Week 02 - Thursday, 14 May 1992
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Looking at the Bill with that objective, looking at the fact that the likelihood of a person committing an offence while released on bail is provided for in this Bill at paragraph 22(1)(c) for adults, and is picked up with similar rigour for bail to children in clause 23, and looking at the fact that that is a much broader provision than the equivalent New South Wales legislation, which really limits the likelihood of offending on bail only to violent or sexual offences or offences against the particular victim or serial offences, I think that gives the community sufficient confidence that their interests will be protected.
Mr Humphries is quite right in saying that the interest of the community is an important factor and that a person who has a record of committing offences while on bail is a person whom the community would expect to be protected from, but the Government's view would be that sufficient protection is granted by making that clearly a criterion and by expanding it to cover a range of offences, any offences, under Territory law, Commonwealth law or law of another State or Territory, which stands in contrast to the New South Wales legislation.
It is, again, perhaps significant that New South Wales, under some years now of Liberal government, has not seen fit to introduce a reverse presumption. In fact, they actually have a reverse presumption for drug offences, which we do not think is necessary here; but there has not been a reverse presumption for where an offence has been committed on bail. In fact, the criterion that you can look at for the likelihood of recommitting an offence while on bail in New South Wales is far narrower than here.
So, we understand the community concern Mr Humphries addresses. We take the view that that concern is adequately addressed by the Bill in its present form. Again, I could say that when this guidance is given to magistrates and judges and police officers, with this criterion, if there is a suggestion that it is not adequately being taken into account, the Assembly could look at it again; but here we are really giving a direction that says that the likelihood of a person committing any offence while on bail is a relevant factor. We are going further than New South Wales. I think the decision should be left to the decision maker, being the police officer, the magistrate or the judge.
MR HUMPHRIES (11.34): I think the argument has been well put already by both me and the Attorney, but I might restate again, from my own point of view, that this is an argument about presumptions. We have already spoken about the presumption - I mean "presumption" in inverted commas, perhaps - that a person is entitled to bail. There would again be a presumption here, even where a person comes before a court, even with these factors clearly set out in clause 22, that that person is entitled to bail. It might not be a very strong presumption, but it is there; and it seems to me that the presumption ought to work in the other direction in this situation. The right to bail is a right, undoubtedly; but it carries with it responsibilities, and a person who fails to honour those responsibilities, it seems to me, in most circumstances, has voided or at least potentially voided that right.
We do have another presumption of exactly the same kind, in fact, in clause 9. Under clause 9 a person shall not be granted bail except in exceptional or special circumstances. That sort of reverse assumption is already in this Bill. If any circumstances should apply to it, it should be a situation where a person has already shown that they cannot comply with the basic requirements of bail, and that is not to go out and commit offences while they are at liberty. That is just a question of what sorts of presumptions are appropriate.
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