Page 443 - Week 02 - Thursday, 14 May 1992
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .
I assume that that is on the assumption that the progression would normally be from more onerous to less onerous conditions; that a person in custody would be granted bail as opposed to a person out on bail on conditions going back into custody. But subclause 39(1) does provide for the power of another authorised officer to vary those conditions. It is possible - perhaps it is not likely, but it is quite possible - for an authorised officer in certain circumstances to impose bail where bail has not previously been imposed. In those circumstances, Madam Speaker, it seems to me that there ought to be the equivalent of subclauses 45(5) and (6) appearing somewhere in Division 1.
It may be that we are requiring by statute that there not be more onerous conditions attached to a person who has already been bailed than have already been given by the person making the first decision. That is a somewhat strange state of affairs, I might say. If the Government in effect is saying to police officers, "You may not impose a more serious condition than has already been imposed by a lower officer in the police station", I think it ought to be stated expressly by this Act.
Alternatively, if, as has been suggested to me, there is an unlimited power effectively of police officers to rearrest anyway, because they have that power under other statutes, it makes nugatory the idea that was inherent in the recommendation of the royal commission that that power ought to be exercised in a less onerous fashion. So, it seems to me that the law is unclear, and I hope that the Attorney can clear it up for my benefit and perhaps consider whether in due course we ought not to more clearly state what the law is.
Moving on, clause 49 of the Bill sets out the penalties to be paid when a person fails to appear pursuant to their undertaking to appear before the court after bail has been granted. It is interesting, Madam Speaker, to note in this particular clause that the punishment meted out in those circumstances could actually be more onerous than the punishment they might have faced had they returned to the court in any case, and that is theoretically possible.
Clause 51 prevents the indemnification of sureties. It is obviously designed to prevent other people who are sureties from having the burden removed from them by possibly someone close to the defendant who would not otherwise have been able to be a surety.
Clause 56 is also interesting to note, Madam Speaker. It prevents a surety - that is, a person who has given some kind of guarantee to the court that another person who is accused of a crime will appear - from effectively rearresting, on his own volition, the accused person. I was quite surprised to discover that until today, at least, there does remain in the ACT, effectively, the equivalent of a citizen's right to arrest an accused person. Indeed, I think that one of the provisions that are being abolished by the consequential provisions Bill is actually a more general right of citizens to arrest other citizens for having committed crimes, whether they have been charged with them or not. I assume that that has been removed by one of those other provisions; but perhaps, again, the Attorney can make that clear. I have given him a lot of homework, I can see; he is having to rush and get some advice on all these things.
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .